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Communication and Concerted Action
William H. Page*
ABSTRACT
It is a familiar scenario in U.S. antitrust litigation: The plaintiffs
allege that a pattern of identical pricing (or refusals to deal) is
"concerted" and therefore per se illegal; the defendant responds that the
practice is merely "consciously parallel" or "interdependent" and
therefore legal. Under U.S. law, to avoid summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law, a plaintiff must produce a "plus factor,"
evidence that "tends to exclude the possibility" that the defendants'
actions were merely interdependent. Courts have identified various plus
factors-for example, evidence that the alleged conduct was against the
defendant's interest unless it was pursuant to an agreement-but they
have been notably vague about what exactly constitutes concerted
action. Obviously, the Sherman Act does not require the plaintiff to
prove that the defendants formed a legally enforceable contract-the
Sherman Act, after all, makes agreements illegal and therefore
unenforceable. But beyond that, the law tells us little. Courts still quote
the Supreme Court's sixty-year-old formulation that a Sherman Act
agreement requires only "a unity of purpose, a common design and
understanding, or a meeting of the minds." Unfortunately, however,
this language could easily be interpreted to condemn conscious
parallelism.
In this article, I argue that concerted action should be defined to
require communication among rivals. I begin by describing the
development of the distinction in law and theory between consciously
parallel and concerted action. I then show that the received definitions
of concerted action leave courts and especially juries with inadequate
guidance. Economic expert testimony does not fill the void, because
Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like
to thank Oliver Black, Roger Blair, Tom Cotter, Michael Freed, Christine Klein, John Lopatka,
Gregg Polsky, Mark McLaughlin, and Spencer Waller for helpful comments. I also benefited
from comments at a workshop at the University of Florida Levin College of Law and at the
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Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
economic theory does not distinguish concerted and interdependent
conduct. I propose, building on the recent work of Oliver Black,1 that
the distinguishing characteristic of concerted action is communication
among rivals, not only of intentions, but also of the firms' reliance on
their rivals' actions in choosing a common course of action. I argue that
the proposed definition has implications for U.S. antitrust law. First, it
is at least consistent with the older Supreme Court cases. Second, it
helps us evaluate whether various public announcements or private
communications justify the inference that parallel conduct is concerted.
Finally, courts applying the standard plus-factors analysis in recent
years have implicitly required something like the communications in the
proposed definition, even though they continue nominally to apply the
received nebulous definitions.
Including communication in the definition of concerted action would
have limited consequences. Communication is itself an ambiguous term
that requires clarification. Even if it can be defined with reasonable
clarity, courts will still be required to determine whether proven
communications satisfy the definition. Moreover, plaintiffs would not
necessarily be required to produce direct evidence of communications
that meet the definition, so long as they can offer circumstantial
evidence that would permit an inference that the requisite
communications have occurred. Thus, the problem of inferring an
agreement from ambiguous evidence, including communications of
various kinds, will remain under the proposal. But at least courts,
juries, and litigants will know better what they are supposed to be
inferring.
1. OLIVER BLACK, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST (2005).
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I. INTRODUCTION
For modem enforcement officials and all but a few scholars,2 the
primary goal of antitrust policy is to penalize cartels and to inhibit their
formation. 3  Even as the per se rule wanes for other practices, 4 it
remains in full force in cases involving garden-variety price-fixing.
5
But to fall within the per se rule, coordinated pricing must be the result
of a "contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy."6 Unlike acts of
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which
may, but need not, involve a conspiracy, restraints of trade like
coordinated pricing are only illegal under section 1 if they are the
product of an agreement. The most challenging issues in interpreting
the agreement requirement in modem antitrust law arise in cases
alleging that oligopolists' parallel price changes or refusals to deal are
concerted. Courts have long recognized that parallel conduct, even if
undertaken with full awareness of rivals' likely responses, does not
necessarily entail an agreement.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita7 twenty years ago,
courts have addressed the issue of agreement primarily in the context of
2. LESTER TELSER, THE THEORY OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION (1987); Donald
Dewey, Information, Entry, and Welfare: The Case for Collusion, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 587
(1979); George Bittlingmayer, Price-Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, in 5 RES. L. & ECON.
57, 57-58 (1983).
3. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 263 (1978) ("The subject of cartels lies at
the center of antitrust policy."); Richard A. Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 500, 529 (1971) ("The cartel... carries within it the seeds of its own destruction.").
See also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Posner's Program for the Antitrust Division: A
Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 48 SMU L. REV. 1713 (1995) (re-evaluating antitrust perspectives
twenty-five years after Posner's article).
4. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (refusing to apply a quick look
rule of reason analysis to a dental association's rules limiting advertising, even though the rule
prevented members from engaging in certain forms of price advertising and making claims of
quality).
5. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (holding per se illegal an
agreement among beer wholesalers to eliminate free-credit sales). Where there is testimonial
evidence of a clear cartel agreement, the Department of Justice will proceed against the members
criminally and those injured by the cartel may follow with civil suits seeking treble damages.
United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d
645, 645 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1990).
6. Courts have not distinguished among the three statutory terms, treating all three as denoting
the same concept of concerted action. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 262 (2d
ed. 2001) ("[T]he courts sensibly have not worried about whether the terms 'contract,'
'combination,' and 'conspiracy,' in section 1, have nonoverlapping meanings."); In re Baby Food
Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 117 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The phrase 'concerted action' is often
used as shorthand for any form of activity meeting the Section I 'contract . combination or
conspiracy' requirement.").
7. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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the plaintiff's burden of production, the obligation to produce sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact for the jury.8 To avoid
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law at trial, plaintiffs
must introduce not only evidence that the defendants' actions were
consciously parallel, but also something more: a "plus factor," evidence
that tends to exclude the possibility that the defendant's actions were
merely interdependent. This focus on the issue of evidentiary
sufficiency to create a jury issue, however, has left the more
fundamental question of what actually constitutes concerted action less
examined. Courts still quote definitions of agreement that long antedate
Matsushita and that fail to distinguish interdependent and concerted
action. In this article, I propose a clarified definition, one that requires
communication among rivals.
In Part II, I briefly recount the development of the distinction in law
and theory between consciously parallel and concerted action. In Part
III, I argue that the received explanations of the distinction are
unnecessarily vague, leaving courts and especially juries with
inadequate guidance in their respective roles. In Part IV, I examine
conceptual analyses of concerted action in hopes of extracting a usable
definition. That review leads me to propose, building on the recent
work of Oliver Black,9 that the distinguishing characteristic of
concerted action is communication among rivals, not only of intentions,
but also of the firms' reliance on their rivals' actions in choosing a
common course of action. In Part V, I clarify some aspects of the
model, using examples from American law. I then show that courts
applying the post-Matsushita plus-factors analysis have implicitly
adopted a definition of concerted action that requires something like the
proposed one, even though they continue to quote the received
formulations.
Including communication in the definition of concerted action will
not condemn communications among rivals that do not convey the
requisite information; nor will it require the plaintiff to produce
evidence of specific communications, so long as there is circumstantial
evidence that would permit an inference that the requisite
communications have occurred. Thus, the problem of inferring an
agreement from ambiguous evidence, including communications of
various kinds, will remain under the proposal.10  Moreover,
8. See infra Part IE.
9. BLACK, supra note 1.
10. Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Ambiguous Is Still Ambiguous, 17 ANTITRUST
48, 48 (Spring 2003).
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communication is itself an ambiguous term that requires interpretation.
Nevertheless, if the term is clarified it can provide better guidance to
courts, juries, and businesses in these difficult cases.
II. CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM AND CONCERTED ACTION
Courts have drawn the line between consciously parallel and
concerted conduct entirely through the common law process. The
Sherman Act, which requires a "contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy," gives them no guidance, perhaps because Congress in 1890
could not have foreseen the possibility of tacit collusion, as conscious
parallelism is sometimes called. The combinations that provoked the
passage of the Sherman Act included "close-knit" entities like the trusts
and holding companies as well as "loose-knit" combinations such as
simple (or "gentlemen's") agreements, pools, and cartels.ll
Whether these and similar arrangements were unlawful depended on
whether they constituted restraints of trade or whether they were
unreasonable, but no one would have suggested they did not constitute
agreements. Many early cartels featured formal charters, spelling out
the obligations of members and providing for committees to ensure
enforcement. 12 According to the laissez-faire ideology espoused by
many economists and social theorists of that era, cartels would
inevitably fail regardless of the existence of a detailed agreement so
long as the government did nothing to enforce them or to block entry. 13
In enacting the Sherman Act, Congress rejected the pure laissez-faire
view by providing civil and criminal penalties as added assurance that
cartels would never form or would easily dissolve. 14 But nineteenth
century legislators would probably not have given much credence to the
notion that firms could coordinate their prices without a detailed
agreement.
11. HANS B. THORELLI, TaE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION 72-85 (1954). For a discussion of the inner workings of a variety of cartels, see
Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEx. L. REv. 515 (2004).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 292-97 (1897)
(providing an example of a formal cartel agreement); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271, 273-75 (6th Cir. 1898), affid 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (providing the text of such an
agreement).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 52 F. 646, 647 (D. Minn. 1892) ("While it may be true
that some of the other dealers might attempt to induce purchasers to be governed by the price
fixed in their locality by the parties to the agreement, and try to keep up prices, yet competition in
the commodity would soon bring the price down, unless there were fraudulent or coercive means
resorted to for the purpose of restraining other dealers."). See generally William H. Page,
Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1991).
14. Page, supra note 13, at 37.
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Economics has recognized for decades, however, that in some
circumstances oligopolists may reach or maintain prices above marginal
cost by recognizing each other's likely responses to competitive
moves. 15 As Edward Chamberlin put the point, "When a move by one
seller evidently forces the other to make a counter move, he is very
stupidly refusing to look further than his nose if he proceeds on the
assumption that it will not."16  Dennis Carlton, Robert Gertner, and
Andrew Rosenfield 17 illustrate the same idea by hypothesizing two gas
stations with identical facilities in a small town, located at the same
intersection, and selling at prices posted on conspicuous signs. "One
likely outcome of 'competition"' in such a market, according to the
authors,
is that each station will charge the price that maximizes joint profits-
the same price they would charge if they could merge. Neither
gasoline station has an incentive to cut price below the monopoly
level. Each realizes that it cannot steal customers from its competitor
before its competitor can respond. And the competitor will respond
because it is more profitable to match the price cut and share the
market at a lower price than to permit the price-cutting station to steal
market share. Each station should rationally anticipate immediate
matching and, therefore, not cut price in the first instance.
Cooperative pricing is thus a logical outcome of the 'game' without
any secret meetings or additional communication. If for some reason
the joint profit-maximizing price were to rise, one station could raise
price. Although the other station likes getting all the business, it
should know that if it does not raise price to its competitor's level, the
competitor will surely lower price very soon. Thus, it should even be
possible to coordinate a price increase in this setting.18
This scenario assumes that the firms are safe from entry and instantly
know each other's posted prices, which are invariably the transaction
15. See, e.g., EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A
RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE ch. 3 (6th ed. 1948) (discussing oligopolists' direct
and indirect influences on each others' pricing decisions). See also DENNIS W. CARLTON &
JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 6 (3d ed. 2000) (describing
game theoretic models of noncooperative oligopoly); Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on
the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law With Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
719, 720-34 (2004) (surveying oligopoly theory).
16. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 15, at 46.
17. Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Communication Among
Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 423 (1997).
18. Id. at 428-29. For discussion of a similar hypothetical, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 128 (2005). See also Stuart D. Gurrea &
Bruce M. Owen, Coordinated Interaction and Clayton § 7 Enforcement, 12 GEO. MASON L. REv.
89, 97 (2003) (game theory confirms that rivals can "recognize the possibility of outcomes above
the competitive level and are able to implement them without any express agreement").
2007]
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prices. In real-world markets, of course, many other factors may make
coordination more difficult. Product differentiation will complicate
coordination on prices and outputs. Lack of information about rivals'
transaction prices will foster cheating because sellers will have an
incentive to chisel if they can do so without immediate detection.
Power buyers will try to negotiate discounts in return for big orders.
Even if rivals can control cheating, supracompetitive prices may attract
unruly new entrants. These conditions might require the firms to
engage in "secret meetings or additional communication" to coordinate
prices. Nevertheless, even in real-world markets, firms may sometimes
charge supracompetitive prices by, for example, using independently
adopted practices that can facilitate parallel outcomes. 19 Conduct in
these circumstances-termed oligopolistic interdependence, tacit
collusion, or conscious parallelism 2°-is undoubtedly noncompetitive in
economic terms. How frequently it actually occurs is not clear.
Scholars have differed over whether interdependent conduct consti-
tutes illegal price fixing. Donald Turner argued that interdependent
conduct should not be characterized as an illegal agreement 21 because
oligopolists rationally take account of competitors' likely responses to
their action22 and cannot sensibly be ordered not to do so.23 Instead, ac-
cording to Turner, the law should pursue a policy of deconcentration of
oligopolies that are prone to interdependent pricing.
Richard Posner argued as a law professor, however, that
interdependence should be illegal in some circumstances 24 because it
involves voluntary choices and is remediable by damages in the case of
simple interdependence 25 and by injunction in the case of parallel use of
19. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 15, at 136-41.
20. Conscious parallelism, or tacit collusion, is the "process, not itself unlawful, by which
firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a
profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and
their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions." Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).
21. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 671 (1962). See generally John E.
Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's Try, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 843 (1996).
22. Turner, supra note 21, at 665. See also CHAMBERLIN, supra note 15, at 31 ("Each is
forced by the situation to take into account the policy of his rival in determining his own, and this
cannot be construed as a 'tacit agreement' between the two."); Werden, supra note 15, at 726
("Not much is gained by trying to force a group of oligopolists to behave as if they were not
aware of their individual influence on each other's policies.") (quoting WILLIAM FELLNER,
COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW 309-10 (1949)).
23. Turner, supra note 21, at 669. Turner would have allowed injunctions against practices
that facilitated coordination. Id. at 675-76.
24. POSNER, supra note 6, at 94-95.
25, Id. at 97-98.
[Vol. 38
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facilitating devices.26  Posner drew on George Stigler's theory of
oligopoly, which treats oligopoly as a special case of the theory of
cartels.27 Under that theory, rivals maximize industry profit by jointly
charging a monopoly price, but individual firms have strong incentives
to cheat by expanding output and shading price in order to increase their
share of sales. Under this view, the same instabilities that confront
cartels also confront firms seeking to maintain prices by tacit means.
Thus, in many instances, even oligopolists will be unable to maintain
noncompetitive prices without mechanisms that permit enforcement.
Where a court can identify and enjoin these enforcement and detection
mechanisms, it can thwart the operation of the cartel. In other cases, it
can penalize rivals' decisions not to cheat.
Since Matsushita, the courts have essentially settled on Turner's
approach, but that outcome was not always so clear. Early Supreme
Court decisions 28  suggested that "courts would characterize as
concerted action interfirm coordination realized by means other than a
direct exchange of assurances." 29 All that was required was "a unity of
purpose, a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the
minds." 30 In its 1954 decision in Theatre Enterprises, the Court drew a
limit, holding that "'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy
out of the Sherman Act entirely." 31  But that case held only that
evidence of consciously parallel conduct did not, by itself, warrant
judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff where there were
independent justifications for the defendants' actions. 32 The Court
suggested in 1968 that consciously parallel conduct could raise a jury
issue of agreement so long as the defendants did not produce evidence
26. Id. at 92 (arguing that evidence that the sellers agreed to establish a basing-point system
should be -'unnecessary to establish a violation of the Sherman Act").
27. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. EcON. 44 (1964).
28. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) ("[The
conspiracy] was inferred from the pattern of price-fixing disclosed in the record. We think there
was adequate foundation for it too. It is not necessary to find an express agreement in order to
find a conspiracy. It is enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants
conformed to the arrangement."); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946)
("No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy."); Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (An express agreement was not necessary to show
a conspiracy when the participants knew about and adhered to the scheme).
29. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st Century, 9
Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 97, 100 (1997).
30. Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 810.
31. Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
32. Id. at 541-42 (holding that defendant's evidence (e.g., of "local conditions surrounding the
[plaintiff's] operation which, they contended, precluded it from being a successful first-run
house") "raised fact issues requiring the trial judge to submit the issue of conspiracy to the jury").
2007] 413
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that they had no motive for joint action. 33  During the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the federal enforcement agencies relied on Posner's
analysis of oligopoly to argue for extending the Sherman Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act to condemn interdependent conduct, but
the courts were unreceptive. 34
Matsushita clarified the law by holding that "to survive a motion for
summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages
for a violation of § 1 must present evidence 'that tends to exclude the
possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted independently." 35  The
lower courts have interpreted Matsushita to require plaintiffs to produce
evidence that "tend[s] to exclude the possibility that the defendants
merely were engaged in lawful conscious parallelism." 36 To visualize
what this requirement means: imagine two intersecting circles, one
representing evidence consistent with independent action and one
representing evidence consistent with concerted action.37  Evidence of
consciously parallel conduct is consistent both with independent action
and with concerted action and thus lies in the intersection of these sets.
That category of evidence is insufficient to carry the plaintiff's burden
of production under Matsushita. The plaintiff must produce evidence
consistent only with concerted action-evidence in the concerted action
circle, but not the independent action circle. 38 The lower courts call this
sort of evidence a plus factor.
33. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968) ("Essentially all that the
lower courts held in this case was that [FED. R. Civ. P.] 56(e) placed upon [plaintiff] the burden
of producing evidence of the conspiracy he alleged only after respondent Cities Service
conclusively showed that the facts upon which he relied to support his allegation were not
susceptible of the interpretation which he sought to give them. That holding was correct."). In
that era, summary judgment (for defendants) was disfavored in antitrust litigation, including cases
alleging concerted action. See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of
Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221,
1284-85 (1989).
34. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 3, at 1718-19 (describing the Antitrust Division and the
FTC's attempts to persuade courts of Posner's position).
35. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). For recent
discussion, see Nickolai G. Levin, The Nomos and Narrative of Matsushita, 73 FORDHAM L. REv.
1627 (2005).
36. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 571 n.35 (11th Cir. 1998).
37. For a diagram illustrating this point, see 2 JOSEPH P. BAUER & WILLIAM H. PAGE, KINTER
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 59 (2d ed. 2002).
38. Some courts have suggested that evidence in "equipoise" does not create a jury issue.
Harcros, 158 F.3d at 569 (holding that where "'circumstantial documentary evidence is in
equipoise summary judgment against the plaintiffs would be in order"). Of course the
plaintiff need only introduce evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action.
If the evidence actually excluded independent action, the plaintiff would be entitled to summary
judgment.
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As courts and commentators have long recognized, Matsushita was
not a typical cartel case because the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy to
charge predatory prices in the United States. The Court thought it
necessary to "limit[] the range of permissible inferences from
ambiguous evidence" 39 in part because the alleged conspiracy was
"implausible" 40 and in part because allowing the jury to infer agreement
in such a case would deter price cutting, which is "the very essence of
competition." 41 Those considerations do not necessarily apply to the
usual case alleging that firms conspired to raise prices and restrict
output. Such a strategy "makes perfect economic sense" 42 to profit-
maximizing firms. Moreover, raising prices and restricting output
below competitive levels is not necessarily the essence of competition. 43
Thus, lower courts have acknowledged that there may be less reason in
cases alleging ordinary cartel behavior to impose strict limitations on
the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence. 44
Even courts that recognize these distinctions, however, still require
that the plaintiff produce evidence that tends to exclude the inference of
interdependent oligopolistic behavior.45 First of all, a cartel explanation
for parallel conduct can be implausible in some circumstances. For
example, one court held that an allegation that wholesale prices
increased because of concerted action after one firm's drastic price cut
was less plausible where the prices during most of the alleged
conspiracy period were lower and rose more slowly than in a
competitive period preceding the alleged conspiracy 46 and where the
firms greatly increased retail promotional expenditures. 47 Even though
a strategy of cartelization can be rational, the evidence must give rise to
39. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
40. Id. at 593.
41. Id. at 594.
42. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir.
1993); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Here, like in
Petruzzi's, plaintiffs' theory of conspiracy-an agreement among oligopolists to fix prices at a
supracompetitive level-makes perfect economic sense [and] absent increases in marginal cost or
demand, raising prices generally does not approximate-and cannot be mistaken as-competitive
conduct."). See also Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1087 (10th Cir.
2006) (holding that it was "certainly economically rational for a group of established firms to
attempt to keep an aggressive competitor out of the market, whether they are doing so to protect
profits or simply to guard market share," and that, consequently "the district court erred in
drawing such limited inferences from Champagne's circumstantial evidence").
43. Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1232.
44. Id.; Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358.
45. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358.
46. Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1320 (11 th Cir. 2003).
47. Id. at 1320-21.
2007]
416 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 38
a reasonable inference that the defendants have actually pursued the
strategy rather than acted interdependently. More important, in many
instances, the actions on which plaintiffs rely to prove conspiracy have
procompetitive justifications. 48 Thus, the Supreme Court's concerns
about deterring procompetitive conduct will often play a role in the
inference of conspiracy based on actions that are apparently beneficial
to consumers.
After Matsushita, the lower courts have required plaintiffs to produce
a plus factor to avoid summary judgment. 49  The term "plus factor,"
which long predates Matsushita,50 has been used to describe a broad
array of types of evidence that, together with interdependent conduct,
might contribute to an inference of agreement. 5 1 The term is now most
often used, however, as a conclusory label to describe evidence that
actually satisfies the plaintiffs burden of production.52  Plaintiffs can
48. In Ethyl, for example, the court refused to enjoin the use of practices, such as price
protection clauses and delivered pricing, that facilitated price stability. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1984). The court pointed out that the practices
arose at a time when there was only a single firm in the market, and thus must have had
competitive benefits that consumers wanted. Id. at 133-34. To allow the practices would deter
firms from making choices that were arguably in the interests of consumers. Id. at 140. Consider
Carlton's gas station hypothetical, described in Part II. Coordination of prices would be more
difficult if the stations did not post their prices on large signs. Consequently, if a jury could infer
concerted action in those circumstances, a court might choose to remedy it by ordering the
stations to post prices only on the pumps. Courts would be unlikely to issue such an order,
however, because it would obviously also increase consumers' search costs and inhibit any future
rivalry that might develop.
49. See, e.g., Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1032-34 (8th
Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff "has the burden to present evidence of consciously paralleled
pricing supplemented with one or more plus factors," and granting defendant summary judgment
because plaintiff did not meet its burden).
50. See, e.g., C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493, 497 (9th Cir.
1952) (examining a series of "plus factors").
51. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 35 (1993) (observing that courts rarely rank
plus factors or "specify the minimum critical mass of plus factors that must be established to
sustain an inference" of collusion). Kovacic identifies as plus factors in this broader sense
"[e]xistence of a rational motive for defendants to behave collectively," "[a]ctions contrary to the
defendant's self-interest unless pursued as part of a collective plan," "[m]arket phenomena that
cannot be explained rationally except as the product of concerted action," "[d]efendant's record
of past collusion-related antitrust violations," "[e]vidence of interfirm meetings and other forms
of direct communications among alleged conspirators," "[d]efendant's use of facilitating
practices," "[i]ndustry structure characteristics that complicate or facilitate the avoidance of
competition," and "[i]ndustry performance factors that suggest or rebut an inference of horizontal
collaboration." Id. at 37-55.
52. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 572, 571 n.35, 572 (11th Cir.
1998) (describing plus factors as "necessary," and stating that plaintiff must show plus factors
"tending to exclude the possibility of lawful action"). See also In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig.,
166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The simple term 'plus factors' refers to 'the additional facts or
factors required to be proved as a prerequisite to finding that parallel action amounts to a
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establish a plus factor by pointing to a constellation of pieces of
evidence that, taken as a whole, create the necessary inference. Even
after Matsushita, courts continue to recognize the principle of
Continental Ore that courts should not "compartmentaliz[e] the various
factual components [of the plaintiffs' case] and wip[e] the slate clean of
scrutiny of each."'53  Nevertheless, each component must have some
tendency to support the inference of concerted action. 54
Under these decisions, were a case like Theatre Enterprises filed
today, the defendants would certainly be entitled to summary judgment
because their parallel actions had independent justifications. 55 But the
same result would follow even if there were no justification, so long as
the evidence did not establish a plus factor. Thus, in a case like Carlton,
Gertner, and Rosenfield's hypothetical scenario, in which oligopolists
are able to coordinate a price increase based solely on their public price
announcements, summary judgment for the defendants would also
follow.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF PRESENT DEFINITIONS OF CONCERTED ACTION
The plus factors approach I have just described has narrowed the
category of cases involving alleged conscious parallelism that will be
allowed to go to the jury. But it has left uncertain, or at least
unexpressed, exactly what it is that distinguishes consciously parallel
conduct from concerted action. Courts must rely on antiquated
statements of the definition that fail to make the crucial distinction
between consciously parallel and concerted practices. To make matters
worse, economic theory provides no standards for making the
distinction. This remarkable ambiguity at the heart of antitrust law is
problematic. It makes the plus factors inquiry less certain and, for those
cases that reach the jury, it leaves the jurors with no guidance in
evaluating the evidence the court has determined constitutes a plus
factor.
conspiracy."' (citation omitted)); cf Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1043 (Gibson, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is
useful to distinguish between 'plus factors' that establish a background making conspiracy likely
and 'plus factors' that tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted without
agreement.").
53. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962).
54. See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir.
2002) (recognizing that "zero plus zero equals zero").
55. One lower court, following Matsushita, has even suggested that in "antitrust cases
summary judgment is particularly favored because of the concern that protracted litigation will
chill procompetitive market forces." PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir.
2002).
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A. Legal Formulations
One court has suggested that concerted action is "a term of art in the
context of the Sherman Act; it cannot be understood as it might be in
ordinary parlance, to reach any and all forms of joint activity by two or
more persons." 56  If concerted action is a term of art, however, one
would expect the courts to explain to jurors just how the meaning of
concerted action in antitrust parlance differs from our ordinary
understanding of the term. But they do not. On the contrary, courts
continue to define concerted action by quoting some version of the
Supreme Court's sixty-year-old definition of agreement as "a unity of
purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of
minds."57 This definition and the related formulation of "a conscious
commitment to a common scheme" 58 tell us (and jurors) little. Unity of
purpose, common design, and common scheme seem to mean the same
thing, that rivals act the same way with the same goal; "common...
understanding" and "conscious commitment" also seem to mean the
same thing, that rivals know they all have the same goal. A "meeting of
the minds" would also seem to refer to the rivals' knowledge of a
common goal. 59 The Court has also informed us that a Sherman Act
agreement need not involve an "explicit agreement," 60 an "express
agreement, '61 a "formal agreement, ' '62 or "letters, agreements, or other
testimonials to a conspiracy." 63
56. Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs, Inc., 307 F.3d 277, 281-82 (4th Cir.
2002).
57. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946). These phrases reappear
repeatedly in the cases, not always with attribution to American Tobacco. See, e.g., In re Flat
Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004) (referring to the words used in American
Tobacco, and adding that there also must be "a conscious commitment to a common scheme")
(citations and internal quotations omitted); Transcript of Jury Instructions at 2318, In re High
Pressure Laminates Antitrust Litig., 00 MDL 1368 (CLB), 2006 WL 931692 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7,
2006) [hereinafter Laminates Transcript], available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
committees/at-trial/pdf/jury-instructions/DOC_00000027.pdf ("The required combination or
conspiracy may be established by showing that the Defendant knowingly came to a common and
mutual understanding with others to accomplish or attempt to accomplish an unlawful purpose
together."); U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, No. 84 Civil 7484 PLK, 1986 WL
10620, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1986) (instructing the jury that "what the plaintiffs must prove
is that the members of the conspiracy, in some way, came to an agreement or mutual
understanding to accomplish their purpose of achieving (or maintaining) a monopoly").
58. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); In re Flat Glass, 385
F.3d at 357 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
59. The Supreme Court could not have meant to incorporate any sort of technical meaning of
this term from the law of contracts, which employs it to determine which arrangements to
enforce, not which arrangements to condemn.
60. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966).
61. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) ("It is enough that a
concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the arrangement.").
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The primary flaw in all of these statements is that they fail to
distinguish concerted from interdependent action, the most important
function that the definition should serve in the horizontal context. 64 It
would not distort "common design or understanding" (or any of the
other phrases) to encompass simple price leadership, as in our gas
station hypothetical. This failure is less surprising if we note that the
most-often-quoted definition of agreement is from the Supreme Court's
1946 American Tobacco decision, which permitted an inference of
conspiracy on the basis of a pattern of parallel price changes that
appeared unjustified by demand and cost conditions. 65 The Court there
went so far as to say that a "combination or conspiracy in violation of
the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealing or other
circumstances as well as in an exchange of words." 66  Herbert
Hovenkamp has recently described the case as "the high point of
judicial recognition that collusion could be based on nonverbal or other
tacit communication." 67 As one might expect, the Court framed a
definition that could embrace conscious parallelism.
This lack of clarity can have a number of unfortunate consequences.
First, it may foster a lack of clarity in pleading. A full discussion of this
issue is beyond the scope of the present article, but a clearer definition
62. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946) (adding that "[o]ften
crimes are a matter of the person accused," and evidence of a violation "may be found in a course
of dealings or other circumstances as well as in any exchange of words").
63. Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Mem'l Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700, 703-04 (1969)
(citing Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 809, for the proposition that no formal agreement is necessary).
64. This point is made forcefully in Kovacic, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 51, at 24-25
(1993). Kovacic cites Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel
Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143
(1993); Peter C. Carstensen, Commentary: Reflections on Hay, Clark, and the Relationship of
Economic Analysis and Policy to Rules of Antitrust Law, 1983 WiS. L. REV. 953, 962 (1983);
Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion, 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 113, 115-21 (1993). See also Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price
Fixing in the Electronic Marketplace, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 47 (1996) (observing that "a court
conscientiously applying these definitions would be led to mistakenly infer an agreement merely
from the consciously parallel interaction among oligopolists"); Werden, supra note 15, at 777-78
("One might reasonably find a *meeting of minds' or a 'conscious commitment to a common
scheme' in the equilibrium of every oligopoly model; in Nash, non-cooperative equilibrium,
competitors' actions depend on the observed actions of their rivals.").
65. Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 804-10.
66. Id. at 809-10. The Court may have meant only that it was reasonable to infer from the
pattern of price changes that an agreement involving an exchange of words actually occurred,
even if there was no specific evidence of an exchange of words. But many scholars at the time
quite understandably read the court as defining conspiracy broadly to include coordination that
did not involve an exchange of words. See Werden, supra note 15, at 742 n.100 (collecting
sources).
67. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARv. L. REV. 917, 925 (2003)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001)).
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of concerted action would appear to require plaintiffs to make
corresponding allegations in the complaint to avoid dismissal.
68
Second, the lack of clarity in the definition of concerted action makes it
less certain which questions will be submitted to the jury. If a plus
factor is evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent
action, the same evidence must also tend to confirm the likelihood of
concerted action. Whether that burden will be met in a particular case
must depend on the applicable definition of agreement. Where the
definition is vague, this decision must be made casuistically on the basis
of fact patterns that have passed or failed the test in earlier cases. There
is much to be said for casuistry, which is the engine of the common
law. 69 Courts may achieve a reasonable consistency using this sort of
analysis. Moreover, courts can rely on unstated definitions while
resolving cases casuistically. In fact, I argue in Part V that courts have
implicitly adopted a more concrete understanding of the meaning of
concerted action since Matsushita than most have been willing to spell
out. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think that greater consistency and
better guidance to juries and businesses would follow if there were a
clearer articulation of the idea of concerted action operating in the cases.
Third, if the court holds the evidence legally sufficient to raise a jury
question, the vagueness of the definition of agreement leaves the jury
with inadequate guidance to resolve the issue of liability. The ABA's
68. In Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965
(2006), the court held that "pleading of facts indicating parallel conduct by the defendants can
suffice to state a plausible claim of conspiracy" and "plus factors are not required to be pleaded to
permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive dismissal." Id. at 114. Under the
definition of concerted action proposed in this article, the plaintiff would be required to allege
communications among rivals, but not the details of the communications. Twombly, for example,
approved another court's rejection of the contention that plaintiffs must allege "when [the
conspiracy] conversations took place, how many occurred, who participated, where the
conversations took place, [and] what topics were discussed as well as ... meeting dates, meeting
places and [names of] individuals employed by ... [d]efendants who allegedly participated." Id.
at 114 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 363 F.
Supp. 2d 1203, 1206 (N.D. Cal. 2005)). Twombly also suggested that it was not fatal that the
plaintiff was unable to "identify specific instances of conspiratorial conduct or communications."
Id. at 117. These results would not change under the proposal. It is not necessary, at least in a
civil case, to identify specific conversations in order to infer that conversations took place. See
infra Part V.C.l. (discussing In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th
Cir. 2002)).
69. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 958 (1995) (arguing "that
legal systems sometimes do and should abandon rules in favor of a form of casuistry [in
which] judgments are based not on a preexisting rule, but on comparisons between the case at
hand and other cases, especially those that are unambiguously within a generally accepted
norm"); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 121-35
(1996) (arguing against inflexible, generalized rules, and advocating casuistry and emphasis on
particulars).
Communication and Concerted Action
Model Jury Instructions in Civil Antitrust Cases,70 which have recently
been revised to reflect current case law, illustrate the problem. The
model instructions define a conspiracy as an agreement, 71 which is
present if "the parties knowingly worked together to accomplish a
common purpose." 72  This statement, like the American Tobacco
formulation, does not distinguish agreement from consciously parallel
conduct in which the parties knowingly choose similar paths to
accomplish a common goal such as sustaining supracompetitive prices.
"Worked together" is of little use, because it could encompass
interdependent actions; if it is interpreted to require more than
interdependence, it merely restates the condition that the defendants'
action be concerted, without indicating what about the action places it in
that category. Other statements in the instruction appear to imply even
more directly that conscious parallelism alone could constitute an
agreement. A conspiracy can exist, according to the instruction, even if
the parties never met or "directly stated what their object or purpose
was.., or the means by which they would accomplish their purpose."73
Indeed, jurors are told, "The agreement itself may have been entirely
unspoken." 74 These statements, although fully supported by the early
cases, are potentially misleading after Matsushita.
There is a separate model instruction for cases involving parallel
conduct, but it does not clarify this issue. It states that evidence of
consciously parallel conduct is not enough to establish an agreement
and that the plaintiff must offer evidence that "tends to exclude the
possibility that the defendant acted independently." 75 The instruction
70. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST
CASES, 2005 EDITION (2005) [hereinafter MODEL INSTRUCTIONS]. For related criticism of an
earlier edition of this publication, see Phillip Areeda, The Rule of Reason-A Catechism on
Competition, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 583-86 (1986).
71. MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 70, at B-2 ("A conspiracy is an agreement by two or
more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by
unlawful means.").
72. Id. at B-3. See also Laminates Transcript, supra note 57, at 2320 ("An unlawful
agreement may be shown if the proof establishes that [the defendants] knowingly worked together
to accomplish a common illegal purpose.").
73. MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 70, at B-2 to B-3 (stating that all plaintiff must show to
"'prove that a conspiracy existed is that the alleged members of the conspiracy in some way came
to an agreement to accomplish a common purpose").
74. Id. at B-3. See also Laminates Transcript, supra note 57, at 2318-19 (stating that an
-'agreement may be tacit and some of its elements may not be formally expressed"; that "the
evidence doesn't have to show that its members entered into any express, formal or written
agreement, or even that they met together, or that they directly stated what their object or
purposes were, or the details of it, or the means by which they would accomplish their purpose;"
and that the -'agreement itself may be entirely unspoken").
75. MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 70, at B-8.
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directs the court to identify for the jury the particular conduct that
amounts to a plus factor, offering as an example evidence showing that
the defendants' "parallel conduct is contrary to [their] independent
business interests." 76 Again, these statements are supported by the law,
but neither gives the jury guidance in deciding whether the evidence
shows interdependent and concerted action.
Courts often mention evidence that is contrary to the defendant's
individual interest as a plus factor.77 This category is important because
it dictates summary judgment in cases like Theatre Enterprises in which
the evidence shows only parallel practices that firms have good reason
to adopt regardless of what their rivals do.78 But in cases in which the
evidence shows firms have engaged in parallel practices without an
independent justification, the "contrary to independent interest"
formulation tells us little. In the gas station hypothetical, for example,
the fact that one gas station follows another's price increase is not
evidence that the action is "contrary to [its] independent business
interests" because firms can legitimately take account of each other's
actions. The action may be contrary to a firm's individual interest
measured by short-run profit maximization, but entirely consistent with
its "individual" interest, if the firm takes account of the likely responses
of its rival.79 Thus, as courts have recognized, the requirement that the
defendant's actions not be in its independent self-interest usually only
restates the requirement of interdependence. 80  Consequently, we need
some other standard to know if evidence tends to exclude independent
conduct.
Of course, under Matsushita, this ambiguity in the instructions would
be harmless if the evidence only showed the price leadership scenario,
because the jury would never hear it: the court would grant the
defendants summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. But let
76. Id.
77. Kovacic, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 51, at 38-42.
78. Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1954). See
also Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming
summary judgment for defendants because plaintiff optometrists failed to offer evidence that a
managed care company's exclusion of them from its network was against its interest); In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.)
(holding that parallel price discrimination was not sufficient to raise a jury question of agreement
because the defendants had an incentive to engage in the practice unilaterally).
79. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003) (not
following a rival's price increase "likely would have resulted in little if any market share gain
[and] would have minimized profits, given that lower prices generate smaller revenues").
80. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW $ 1434(c)(1), at 245 (2d ed. 2000) and
POSNER, supra note 6, at 100).
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us suppose the court finds there is a plus factor and allows the case to go
to the jury. In that case, the model instruction would inform the jurors
that "if you conclude that the plaintiff has carried the burden of
producing evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that certain
defendants acted independently, then you must find for the plaintiff and
against the defendant on the question of whether those defendants
participated in the conspiracy." 81
There are two problems with this instruction. First, it confuses the
burden of production with the burden of persuasion. Matsushita's
"tends to exclude" formulation states only the plaintiff's burden of
production, that is, what the plaintiff must produce to "survive a motion
for summary judgment or for a directed verdict." 82 Even if the plaintiff
carries that burden, the jury is free to disbelieve the evidence or to
conclude that, on balance, the defendants did not agree. It would be
formally correct to instruct the jury that it must find for the plaintiff if it
concludes that the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendants had not acted independently. 83  But even that
statement would not correct the second and more fundamental flaw in
the instruction: it does not define agreement other than tautologically as
the absence of independent action. The jury must not only infer what
happened as factual matter, it must also determine whether what
happened amounted to an agreement. The instruction gives the jury
little guidance on this critical function-understandably so, because the
law itself provides little guidance.
B. Economic Expert Testimony
Nor can economic testimony assist the jury on the ultimate issue of
agreement. Economic evidence may establish the conditions of
interdependence and may exclude variables that might provide
independent justifications for the defendants' actions. Economic
experts may testify to issues such as market definition and damages
even though those are ultimate issues in many cases. For those issues,
the expert is qualified to testify to every aspect of the issue, because
there is no gap between the legal and economic concepts involved in
81. MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 70, at B-8 to B-9.
82. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
83. See, e.g., Laminates Transcript, supra note 57, at 2332 (reading the following question
from the special verdict form that would be submitted to the jury: "Have Plaintiffs proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Wilsonart had an agreement or participated in a
conspiracy with any other manufacturer of high pressure laminates, with the purpose of raising or
maintaining the price of high pressure laminates sold in the United States, excluding Peninsula
Florida?").
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resolving them. On the ultimate issue of whether behavior is the result
of a contract, combination, or conspiracy, however, courts routinely
prevent economists from offering an opinion, 84 because economics has
surprisingly little to say about this issue.
The same characteristics that predispose a market toward the forma-
tion of a cartel also predispose it toward interdependent behavior.
85
While the law distinguishes concerted and interdependent behavior,
economic theory does not: 86 "formal economic theory tells us that any
outcome that is possible with [cheap] talking is possible without it."
87
Game theory does model cooperative games in which the players can
form coalitions. 88  But cooperation, in that context, means that the
players' commitments are legally binding-an assumption that makes
84. Robert A. Milne & Jack E. Pace, Conspiratologists at the Gate: The Scope of Expert
Testimony on the Subject of Conspiracy in a Sherman Act Case, 17 ANTITRUST 36, 39-42 (2003)
(arguing experts should testify only to "relatively objective factors as whether there is an
economic motive to conspire, whether the market structure is conducive to collusion, whether
defendants' conduct is consistent with their non-interdependent business interests and the like").
Some argue economic experts should be allowed to testify to whether the defendant's actions are
collusive in an economic sense. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Economic Experts in Antitrust
Cases, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
111, 141 (David L. Faigman, et al., eds. 2002) (stating that an expert should be permitted to
testify that "a fact inference of agreement is warranted" by the economic evidence); Robert F.
Lanzillotti & James T. McClave, Comment: Meeting the "Ambiguity" Test Under Daubert, 17
ANTITRUST 44, 45 (Spring 2003) (suggesting that an expert should be permitted to testify to the
Bayesian "likelihood ratio" of collusion because their expertise can tell "whether the evidence
was more likely to have been generated in a collusive than in a non-collusive market"); George J.
Stigler, What Does an Economist Know?, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 311-12 (1983) (arguing that an
expert should be permitted to testify that economics suggests that defendants are "de facto
members of a cartel"); all quoted and criticized in Milne & Pace, supra, at 38-39. The difficulty
with all of these suggestions is that the jury would be likely to assume that the economist's
definition is the same as the legal one. See Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d
1287 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (excluding economic testimony of collusion that used a definition different
from the legal one).
85. See MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 39-52 (2006)
(discussing several structural and behavioral factors to consider when analyzing price-fixing
conspiracies).
86. Id. at 20. See also Stigler, supra note 84, at 312 ("There is no established economic
content to words such as 'collusion,' 'conspiracy,' or 'concerted action."'); Werden, supra note
15, at 726 (observing that, "from an economic point of view the difference between true
agreement [produced by explicit bargaining] and quasi-agreement [produced by implicit
bargaining] is one affecting fine points more than the fundamental characteristics of the
problem") (quoting from WILLIAM FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEw 15-16 (1949)).
87. WHINSTON, supra note 85, at 46.
88. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 9 (1990)
(comparing cooperative and noncooperative game theory, and stating that "in co-operative game
theory the unit of analysis is most often. . the coalition"); MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 217 (1982) (describing differences between cooperative and
noncooperative models of game theory and suggesting that the players' behavior under the
cooperative theory involves the "notion of coalition and joint action").
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the analysis essentially useless in defining antitrust conspiracies. 89
Noncooperative game theory has shown that noncompetitive results can
occur without the strong form of cooperation, as the gas station hypo-
thetical shows, but these results cannot tell us which of the
noncompetitive outcomes involve concerted action in a legal sense.
Econometric studies showing departures from the behavior of competi-
tive firms cannot distinguish consciously parallel from concerted
practices because "[w]hat matters for the empirical estimates is the out-
come and not the cause of noncompetitive pricing." 90
What is decisive in these cases is noneconomic evidence of the cause,
particularly involving communications. This sort of evidence may
strongly suggest a cartel, but "economic expertise cannot contribute to
drawing this inference." 91 This conclusion is obviously true where the
expert tries to apply a more expansive definition of agreement than the
legal definition. 92  But even if the expert purports to apply the legal
definition, whatever that may be, the testimony should be excluded
because it is outside of an economist's expertise. One court has held
that an expert should not be permitted to testify to the ultimate issue of
agreement, because the jury is "entirely capable of determining whether
or not to draw such conclusions without any technical assistance from
[economists]. '  Unfortunately, as we have seen, the jury will be
hindered in this task by an inadequate legal definition.
89. Cf Werden, supra note 15, at 729 (describing the oligopoly model created by Reinhard
Selten, set forth in Reinhard Selten, A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, Where 4 Are Few
and 6 Are Many, 2 INT'L J. GAME THEORY 141 (1973)).
90. Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 415, 452 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig
eds., 1989) (noting that a difficult, and perhaps impossible, problem with all statistical approaches
to testing price-taking behavior is that "it is impossible to distinguish pure tacit collusion from
illegal price-fixing or other explicit cartel agreements").
91. See Werden, supra note 15, at 792-93 (suggesting that "'expert economists often draw
inferences that may be reasonable but do not involve the practice of economics"). Werden
suggests that an expert may properly testify to whether aggressive price cutting is punishment for
cheating on a cartel agreement, and to whether a pattern of communications could constitute
"negotiation to consensus on price or output." Id. at 793.
92. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1323 (affirming the exclusion
of the testimony of an expert who "defined collusion to include conscious parallelism ... [and]
did not differentiate between legal and illegal pricing behavior, and instead simply grouped both
of these phenomena under the umbrella of illegal, collusive price fixing. This testimony could
not have aided a finder of fact to determine whether appellees' behavior was or was not legal, and
the district court properly excluded it.").
93. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 565 (1 1th Cir. 1998). See also
Ohio v. Lewis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 (S.D. Ohio 1996) ("[E]xperts may not
express an opinion in the form of a legal conclusion regarding the existence of an illegal
conspiracy."); but cf Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224,
1240-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (allowing expert economic testimony where cross-examination, contrary
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IV. COMMUNICATION AND CONCERTED ACTION
Commentators have recently brought differing perspectives to the
issue of the definition of agreement in the context of parallel actions by
oligopolists. Oliver Black develops a clearer definition based on a
philosophical analysis of the concept of concerted action as it is used in
European competition law. Black's definition focuses on the role of
communication among rivals. Although he derives the theory using the
tools of analytical philosophy, I suggest that this definition is consistent
with the economic approach to antitrust law, which I endorse. We have
already seen that economic theory does not formally distinguish
concerted action from consciously parallel action. Nevertheless,
economics does not contradict an approach that distinguishes these two
conditions by focusing on the role of communication. Economists
Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfield argue that the concept of agreement is
so vacuous in both economic and legal terms that it should be displaced
as the focus on section 1 inquiry in cases involving exchanges of
information among competitors. But their analysis of the role of
communications in fostering coordination is consistent with including
communications in the definition of concerted action. Moreover, even
though the role of communications in concerted action may be difficult
to model formally, many economists believe it is essential in practice.
A. A Philosophical Perspective
Oliver Black has recently attempted to specify the concept of
concerted action using the tools of analytical philosophy.94 Black
classifies conduct along a spectrum of degrees of "correlation" between
parties and their respective actions, with the highest constituting
concerted action, 95 which European competition law distinguishes from
agreement.96 This model has interesting implications for American law.
The levels of correlation, in ascending order, are:
Independent action: each party does an act entirely independently of
the other.
evidence, and careful instruction would limit the possibility of the testimony causing unfair
prejudice).
94. BLACK, supra note 1.
95. Id. at 185-87. He uses the term correlation consciously in order to avoid terms that imply
a legal characterization.
96. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 81(1), Nov. 10, 1997,
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ECconsol.html (prohibiting "all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market").
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Mutual belief: the firms act, each believing the other is acting in a
particular way.
Mutual reliance: the firms act, not only believing the others will act
in a certain way, but relying on them to do so.
Mutual reliance with a common goal: the firms act in reliance on
their belief that the others will act in a certain way, and in doing so the
firms have the same goal.
Mutual reliance with a common goal and with knowledge: the firms
act knowing that all of the foregoing conditions have been satisfied.
Mutual reliance with a common goal and with knowledge gained, in
part, by communication: the firms act knowing that all conditions have
been satisfied in part because they communicate their reliance and their
goals to each other.
This highest level of correlation, according to Black, constitutes a
concerted practice. 97
Under Black's definition, the critical issues in evaluating parallel
conduct are whether the requisite reliance, belief, and knowledge that
accompany the parties' actions were acquired, at least in part, by
communication between the rivals. Black recognizes that
"[c]ommunication comes ... in various forms and degrees." 98  As to
form, the range includes indirect communications, mediated by a third
person; "non-specific" communication, in which "someone makes a
general announcement"; "inexplicit" communication, in which "the
hearer needs to make large inferences in order to reach the speaker's
meaning"; and non-linguistic communication by "nods or eye
contact." 99 As to "degrees" of communication, the range runs from a
case in which "the speaker says something to the hearer in words which
they both understand in the words' normal sense" to "somewhere short
of the case where one person simply causes another to believe
something."' 00  In each case, however, the communication must
97. BLACK, supra note 1, at 187. Black argues that "concerted practice" under Article 81 of
the European Treaty is a species of joint action. Id. at 157-58. Conduct falling short of joint
action may represent a form of coordinated pricing that would be of concern in evaluating a
prospective merger, but does not constitute a concerted practice. Id. at 161. He distinguishes
concerted action from "agreement" under Article 81. Id. at 164-66.
98. Id. at 161.
99. Id. at 152-55. Cf. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965) ("A
knowing wink can mean more than words."); see also Werden, supra note 15, at 766-67
(describing a bid rigging conspiracy in which a bidder signaled its desire to win one auction by
submitting a bid in another auction ending in digits that corresponded to the trading area covered
by the first auction).
100. BLACK, supra note 1, at 154.
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successfully convey the speaker's intention to act in a certain way in
reliance on others doing the same. 10 1
Black also distinguishes the definition of concerted action from proof
of concerted action. 102 He has little to say about the latter issue, but
suggests that the sort of economic evidence of market structure,
conduct, and performance that is typical in cases alleging horizontal
price fixing would all be relevant to the question of whether concerted
action, properly defined, had occurred. Conceivably, one might be able
to infer that the requisite knowledge, reliance, common goals, and
communication were present without any specific evidence of
communication, if the parties' conduct could be explained in no other
way. Obviously, however, under a definition that requires
communication of a particular sort, evidence of specific
communications is important.
Black also (following EU law) distinguishes concerted action and
agreement. 10 3  Concerted practices, in Black's view, involve
communication followed by parallel action to complete the offense.
10 4
Agreement, by contrast, can be completed solely by communication, if
one party makes a conditional promise and another party makes a
promise in response. The parties' subsequent actions would be evi-
dence of agreement if they permitted the inference that the mutual
promises had occurred.
Black's analysis is framed using the terminology of Article 81 of the
European Treaty, which differs slightly from the language of section 1
of the Sherman Act.10 5 Nevertheless, Black's analysis provides a useful
101. Id. at 159-60; Oliver Black, Communication, Concerted Practices, and the Oligopoly
Problem, 1 EUR. COMPETITION J. 341, 342-46 (Oct. 2005). More precisely, for a firm's action to
constitute communication, it must: be made with the intention of causing a rival (1) to believe the
firm is acting in reliance on the rival's acting in a certain way, and (2) to believe this in part
because it recognizes the firms' intention; moreover, the action must successfully cause the rival
to believe the firm is acting in reliance on the rival's corresponding act, and the rival must believe
this in part because it recognizes the firms' intentions. Id.
102. BLACK, supra note 1, at 162.
103. Id. at 164-66.
104. See id. at 159-60 (criticizing a statement in a European case suggesting that mere
communication of intentions may amount to a concerted practice even if "the parties do not act in
mutual reliance").
105. Compare Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 96 (prohibiting "all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market") with 15
U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2004) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.").
(Vol. 38
Communication and Concerted Action
basis for examining the conditions necessary for determining when
consciously parallel action constitutes an agreement under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.1°6 Before turning to the applicability of the definition
to U.S. law, however, it may be helpful to consider its consistency with
economics.
B. An Economic Perspective
Black's proposal to include communication in the definition of
concerted action is explicitly based on a philosophical analysis and only
indirectly draws on economic ideas. One might object that, because the
goal of antitrust is to promote economic efficiency, antitrust rules
should be based solely on economic theory and empirical studies.
Indeed, as we will see in this section, Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfield
argue that "agreement" as it is used in the oligopoly pricing cases is a
noneconomic concept and should not be used to trigger per se illegality,
except in the clearest cases. I suggest, however, that clarifying the
concept of concerted action by the inclusion of a communication
requirement can be defended on economic grounds. Even if economic
theory has not shown that explicit communication is necessary for
noncompetitive oligopoly pricing, most economists believe that it is
usually necessary in complex real-world markets. If we credit those
empirical estimates, communication is a sensible defining characteristic
of agreement, and including it in the definition is likely to reduce error
costs more than the rule of reason inquiry proposed by Carlton, et al., or
the present vague standard.
As we saw in the last Part, the economic theory of oligopoly does not
distinguish consciously parallel action to achieve a competitive outcome
from (self-enforcing) concerted action to achieve a competitive
outcome. This gap in the theory has led some economists to challenge
antitrust law's reliance on the distinction. Carlton, Gertner, and
Rosenfield, for example, argue that the existence of an agreement, under
some artificial definition, should not be the decisive issue in cases
involving exchanges of information among rivals, because the word
cannot usefully distinguish efficient and inefficient conduct.10 7
"Agreement" would certainly include a legally enforceable contract,
according to these authors, because "each side knows what it is
obligated to do and knows that if it breaches, it faces a penalty that will
106. BLACK, supra note 1, at 184.
107. Carlton et al., supra note 17, at 424 ("'[A]greement' does not have a sufficiently clear
economic (or, in our view, even legal) meaning which allows one to decide independent of the
industry facts whether a particular form of communication should be banned").
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be enforced by courts-either specific performances or damages."
10 8
But, as the authors recognize, legal enforceability is a useless criterion
for evaluating conduct under section 1, which applies only to
"agreements" that courts will not enforce. 10 9 It would nevertheless be
"sensible," the authors argue, to extend the idea of agreement to reach
cases in which "competitors meet to set price and to restrict aggregate
output and the meeting ends with an understanding of what each party is
to do, and then each does what it promised."110 But the concept of
agreement should not be used to condemn under the per se rule more
attenuated interactions among competitors. "Agreement" does not
distinguish efficient communications from inefficient ones.
Consequently, the authors suggest that direct or indirect interfirm
communications be evaluated under the rule of reason to determine if
they are likely to harm consumers by restricting output more than would
have been the case absent the exchange of prices.
111
The authors identify three factors that influence whether communica-
tions are likely to be anticompetitive: whether the communications are
public, to both competitors and consumers; whether the information
communicated is historical, current, or future; and whether the commu-
nications are repeated.1 12 Public communications to both consumers
and rivals conceivably could restrain competition, but much more likely
would make the market more competitive by making consumers more
informed in the search process. 113 Distribution of historical price and
cost data, particularly if aggregated, can provide useful information for
benchmarking or formulation of best practices, without being of much
use in coordinating current prices; communication of future prices is
much more likely to facilitate coordination. 114 Finally, even private
communications about future pricing actions are more likely to change
rivals' beliefs and actions if, by repeated communications, the firm
making the statement has developed a reputation for truthfulness. 115
Something like these authors' proposal to focus directly on
anticompetitive effect is already the established approach in cases
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at427.
112. Id. at431-32.
113. Id. at 432-34.
114. Id. at434-35.
115. Id. at 435-36. For a similar analysis, see Maurice E. Stucke, Evaluating the Risks of
Increased Price Transparency, 19 ANTITRUST 81, 82 (2005) (noting that private communication
of nonpublic pricing is a positive factor for a rule of reason analysis).
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involving formal information exchanges among competitors. In these
cases, typified by the trade association cases of the 1920s1 16 and
Container,117 the element of agreement is satisfied by the implicit or
explicit agreement to exchange information. These sorts of agreements
are judged under the rule of reason, because exchanges can benefit
consumers by spreading information in the market.118 The focus of
analysis is on whether the exchange of information has an
anticompetitive effect on prices given the form and substance of the
exchanges and the structure of the industry. Exchanges are lawful if "a
legitimate business reason for the exchange offsets any likely
anticompetitive effect ....,,119
Interestingly, in these cases, it is often difficult to distinguish the
issue of the effects of the agreement to exchange information from the
issue of whether the parties have agreed to fix prices. An information
exchange may be unlawful if it is found to have an unreasonable effect
on prices, or if it is found to be a plus factor permitting an inference of a
per se illegal agreement to fix prices. 120  The similarity of the two
inquiries is no coincidence. The inference of an agreement to fix prices
in a per se analysis serves a similar function to the balancing of
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of an agreement to exchange
information in a rule of reason analysis. The existence of an agreement
in cases alleging price fixing is not a purely formal issue; it is the
dividing line between lawful and unlawful behavior, and thus involves
policy choices about the legitimacy of various types of interactions
among rivals. The Supreme Court recognized this characteristic of
agreement in Matsushita by elevating the burden of production when
the plaintiff alleged a violation that closely resembled a procompetitive
practice.
Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfield's proposal to focus directly on
competitive effects is fully consistent with these sorts of cases. It is
problematic, however, in cases in which there is no proven agreement to
exchange information. In these cases also, the authors propose to
evaluate the conduct under the rule of reason. But the proposal does not
116. Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); United States v. Am.
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); Maple Flooring Mfg. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563
(1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
117. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 334-35 (1969).
118. United States v. Citizen & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975).
119. Debra J. Pearlstein et al., 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS (FIFTH) 95 (2002).
120. Cf Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (distinguishing between
information exchange as plus factor in establishing per se illegal price fixing agreement and
independent violation under rule of reason).
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address how to resolve the legal requirement of proving an agreement,
which applies to rule of reason cases as well as per se cases. The
authors seem to suggest that, in cases of interdependent pricing, courts
should find an agreement under some relaxed definition, then determine
legality by applying a rule of reason informed by the insights of game
theory. The agreement would be illegal if the communications
increased the likelihood that the market equilibrium will be worse for
consumers-that is, whether the communications gave the rivals an
"extra ability to raise prices."' 121
This approach would seemingly have the advantage of making the
issue of the legality of parallel pricing a more purely economic one.
But it would do so at the expense of eliminating Matsushita's
requirement that the plaintiff produce something more than evidence of
interdependence in order to raise a jury issue. Consequently, it is
unlikely that reliance on the rule of reason would reduce net error costs.
More cases would almost certainly go to the jury under a rule of reason
standard than currently are submitted to the jury under Matsushita.
Some conduct a jury would find amounted to a per se illegal agreement
might be found lawful under the authors' proposed rule of reason; on
the other hand, some cases that would never reach the jury under
Matsushita might be found unlawful under the rule of reason.
Subjecting most oligopoly pricing to rule of reason scrutiny might deter
efficient conduct. 122
Including communication in the definition of concerted action is a
more promising reform. Communication, if that term is properly clari-
fied, is an appropriate basis for distinguishing concerted from interde-
pendent conduct. 123 It is true that oligopoly theory does not prove that
121. Carlton et al., supra note 17, at 431.
122. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1984), the
Supreme Court recognized that the statutory requirement that restraints of trade be concerted
creates a gap in the coverage of the Sherman Act. There may be actions of individual firms
without monopoly power that restrain trade and harm consumers. Id. at 775. Nevertheless, the
Act "leaves untouched a single firm's anticompetitive conduct (short of threatened
monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the conduct of two firms
subject to § 1 liability," because "[s]ubjecting a single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for
reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust laws
seek to promote." Id. In these passages, the Court was explaining why section 1 did not apply to
agreements among a parent company and its subsidiaries, but a similar logic applies in the context
of consciously parallel actions. Id. at 771, 776-77. Bypassing the requirement of agreement, or
reducing it to a reasonableness inquiry could ultimately deter efficient conduct. The concept of
agreement is ambiguous, but the rule of reason involves uncertainties of its own. These
uncertainties might be mitigated by tailoring the level of scrutiny under the rule of reason
depending upon the characteristics of the information exchange. But even these measures may
not avoid the costs of overdeterrence.
123. Turner, supra note 21, at 683 ("Once one goes beyond the boundaries of explicit,
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communication is necessary or sufficient to achieve noncompetitive
prices. In desert-island scenarios, like the gas station hypothetical,
communication may not be necessary for the parties to cooperate.
Where the parties do have an incentive to cheat, communication may
not be sufficient to overcome it, because the parties have the same
incentive to lie about their intentions. Still, there is reason to think that
communication will, as a practical matter, increase cooperation. As one
judge put it, "[S]uccessful price coordination requires accurate predic-
tions about what other competitors will do; it is easier to predict what
people mean to do if they tell you." 124
There is some support, albeit inconclusive, in experimental studies
for this intuition. As Christopher Leslie summarizes the results:
[S]ubjects who were unlikely to cooperate in the absence of
communication saw their cooperation rates raise dramatically once the
players were allowed to exchange promises to cooperate.
Communication seems to have a linear relationship with trust. The
more time that subjects have to communicate, the greater their
cooperation; the more communications that are exchanged, the greater
the cooperation. Furthermore, "[c]ooperation apparently increases as
communication becomes more explicit." 12 5
As we have already seen, Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfield offer a
similar summary of the sorts of communications that are likely to
facilitate noncompetitive pricing. Nevertheless, Michael Whinston
cautions, "IT]here does not yet appear to be a consensus in the
experimental literature about the exact circumstances and manner in
which cheap talk about intended play matters." 126
Despite the equivocal implications of theory and empirical studies,
most economists believe that stable coordinated pricing usually requires
both mutual recognition of self-interest and direct communication. 127
verbally communicated assent to a common course of action-a step long since taken and from
which it would not seem reasonable to retreat it is extraordinarily difficult if not impossible to
define clearly a plausible limit short of interdependence.").
124. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1042 (8th Cir. 2000)
(Gibson, J., dissenting).
125. Leslie, supra note 11, at 538-39 (citations omitted).
126. WHINSTON, supra note 85, at 23.
127. Werden, supra note 15, at 763 (noting that game theoretic "models show that pricing
coordination is possible under certain circumstances, but very few economists take the models so
literally that they believe coordinated pricing occurs without communication of any form");
Kenneth G. Elzinga, New Developments on the Cartel Front, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 3, 25 (1984)
(observing that "coordination cannot be simply spontaneous" and "the needed efforts at
concurrence, coordination, and compliance should yield sufficient smoking-gun-type evidence for
conviction").
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Xavier Vives has observed that "[c]learly, communication is necessary
to sustaining collusion." 128 He continues:
The research on the effect of communication on collusion is not yet
conclusive. In repeated games, for instance, in the presence of
imperfect monitoring and privately observed signals, it is not known
whether full collusion is possible without communication or whether
communication is even needed for collusion. However, in general, the
presumption is that communication abets collusion.
129
Whinston has similarly noted that it is "paradoxical that the least
controversial area of antitrust," the illegality of concerted but not
interdependent behavior, "is perhaps the one in which the basis of the
policy in economic theory is the weakest." 130  Nevertheless, he
continues, "most economists are not bothered by this, perhaps because
they believe (as I do) that direct communication (and especially face-to-
face communication) often will matter for achieving cooperation, and
that procompetitive benefits of collusion are both rare and difficult to
document." 131 Economists with enforcement experience agree.
Jonathan Baker has suggested that the plus factors are "the kinds of
things that suggest that there really was a secret agreement, such as
secret direct communications just before prices rise" and evidence that
rivals have achieved a noncompetitive outcome by a "'forbidden
process' of negotiation and exchange of assurances." 132  Gregory
Werden has gone so far as to propose on "practical and policy" grounds
that the "existence of an agreement should not be inferred absent some
evidence of communications of some kind among the defendants
through which an agreement could have been negotiated."'
133
Thus, informed empirical estimates suggest that communication is
usually, if not invariably, necessary for successful cooperation in real-
world markets. This suggests that communication is an economically
appropriate basis for distinguishing interdependent and concerted
action. Not all communications, of course, would satisfy the proposed
definition. But Black's suggestion that the communications should
convey the intention to act and reliance on others to follow suit provides
a starting point for further analysis. Black also suggests that the
communications need not amount to a completed verbal agreement.
128. XAVIER VIVES, OLIGOPOLY PRICING: OLD IDEAS AND NEW TOOLS 320 (MIT Press
1999).
129. Id. at 321.
130. WHINSTON, supra note 85, at 26.
131. Id.
132. Baker, Electronic Marketplace, supra note 64, at 48.
133. Werden, supra note 15, at 780.
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Nevertheless, difficult choices would remain in shaping the
communication requirement.
Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfield's analysis of the probative value of
various types of evidence of communications in a rule of reason inquiry
can also inform the issue of inference of concerted action under the
proposed definition. As we have seen, in cases involving agreements to
exchange information, it is often difficult to distinguish the issue of
whether the exchange is anticompetitive and, therefore, illegal under the
rule of reason from the issue of whether the exchange facilitates a price
fixing conspiracy that is illegal per se. This is because the issue of
agreement incorporates many of the policy considerations that guide the
rule of reason inquiry. As the authors suggest, the form, frequency, and
content of communications can influence their likely competitive effect.
Thus, the authors' analysis of the likely competitive effects of different
types of communications should be relevant to proof of agreement.
Suppose, in the authors' gas station hypothetical, the evidence
showed that one of the station owners telephoned the other and each
said he would increase prices by 10 cents the next day in reliance on the
other's doing so, and both followed suit. Under the proposed definition,
the owner's actions would be concerted, even though abstract economic
theory does not dictate this result. The noncompetitive joint price in-
crease is an equilibrium that can theoretically be reached regardless of
any communication. Moreover, the communication is cheap
(unenforceable) talk, so it is not clear why it should influence the other
station owner's belief about what action the other station owner will
do. 134 Nevertheless, the content and the circumstances of the communi-
cation-for example, that it is private and relates to future prices, both
factors that Carlton, et al., identify-could make it reasonable to infer
that the communication facilitated coordination rather than performing a
benign function.
V. THE COMMUNICATION MODEL AND THE SHERMAN ACT
We are now in a position to consider whether the proposed definition
is applicable to American law. One might argue that the Supreme
Court's pre-Matsushita cases that address the meaning and proof of
agreement under the Sherman Act foreclose such a concrete
requirement. Those cases undoubtedly establish that "courts would
characterize as concerted action interfirm coordination realized by
means other than a direct exchange of assurances." 135 But the proposed
134. WHINSTON, supra note 85, at 22-24.
135. Kovacic, supra note 29, at 100.
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definition does not require that the communications be direct, nor does
it require that the communications amount to an exchange of
assurances, that is, a completed verbal agreement. Because something
more than conscious parallelism is necessary for actions to be
concerted, communication of some sort is the best and perhaps the only
candidate for a practical distinguishing factor.
In this Part, I argue first that the early Supreme Court precedents can
be reconciled with a model that focuses on communication. I then
clarify some of the implications of the model using American case law.
Finally, I examine the three most recent important cases in the courts of
appeals that address the question of concerted action and suggest that
they have explicitly or implicitly moved toward a definition of
concerted action that is consistent with the one proposed here.
A. Supreme Court Cases
As we have seen, the unhelpful definition of agreement most
frequently cited today originated in the cryptic and dubious American
Tobacco case. That case probably accounts for the misleading
statement in the Model Jury Instructions that an illegal agreement may
be "entirely unspoken." The Court's other leading cases have also been
vague both in defining concerted action and in their analyses of
evidence that concerted action has occurred. Nevertheless, they can at
least be reconciled with the focus on communication that I propose
here.
In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United
States,136 the association collected complaints from its members about
wholesale lumber dealers who sold directly to consumers. If a board
determined the complaint was valid, the name of the wholesaler would
be added to a "blacklist" that the secretary of the association would
distribute to members. Association members often refused to deal with
the named wholesalers. Although there was no stated agreement among
the dealers to refuse to deal with the blacklisted wholesalers, the evident
purpose and "natural consequence" of the "concerted action" of
circulating the list, according to the Supreme Court, was to lead the
dealers to do so. 137 Consequently, a conspiracy to accomplish that end
could be inferred.
The retailers argued that the agreement was "necessary to the
protection of the retail trade and promotive of the public welfare in
136. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
137. Id. at612.
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providing retail facilities" 138 because the wholesalers were cream-
skimming by selling to large consumers without the expense of
maintaining local lumberyards. But the Court viewed this argument as
simply whining about lower-cost competition and not a justification for
a boycott. The Court was especially concerned that the arrangement
"tends to prevent other retailers who have no personal grievance against
[the wholesaler], and with whom he might trade, from so doing, they
being deterred solely because of the influence of the report circulated
among the members of the associations." 139 The Court appeared here to
suggest that there was no legitimate independent reason for dealers who
did not compete with a direct-selling wholesaler to refuse to deal with
him because of the blacklist if he offered the best price. These retailers
only benefited from their refusals to deal because others did so as well.
If the evidence had showed only parallel refusals to deal with direct-
selling wholesalers by strangers to the offending transactions, a court
would likely have concluded the actions were independent. But
centralized collection of complaints and the distribution of blacklists,
along with membership in the association, supplied the requisite
element of communication. Individual retailers did not necessarily
communicate directly among themselves, nor did they necessarily report
any refusals to deal with direct-selling wholesalers to the association.
But retailers who refused to deal did so based on the blacklist,
assembled from reports of their rivals, and (it is reasonable to infer)
acted in reliance that their rivals would do so as well-a reliance gained
from the blacklist itself. The blacklist did not, like a list of firms
engaged in fraud, 140 contain information that would lead a retailer to
refuse to deal regardless of what other retailers did. The blacklist was
effective only if the firms acted jointly-something they could not do
without the list. Thus, the blacklists themselves were communications,
adopted by collective action, which included regular complaints of
direct dealing that provided the critical information on behalf of the
members of the association.
More problematic is Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States.141 In
that case, a representative of two circuits of first-run movie exhibitors
wrote a letter to its distributors demanding that the distributors impose
restrictions in their licensing agreements that required second-run
exhibitors to raise their admission prices and avoid showing double
138. Id. at 613.
139. Id. at 612.
140. See Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 601-06 (1925).
141. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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features. The letter named all of the distributors as addressees. The
distributors largely acceded to the demands of one of the circuits and
uniformly rejected the demands of the other circuit.142 The Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's inference of a conspiracy among the
distributors even though there was no testimony describing direct
communications among them. The form of the letter assured that each
distributor knew that all of the others had received the same proposal,
and there was "strong motive for . . . uniformity of action. '"143 The
pattern of uniform acceptance and rejection of the proposals to change
established marketing practices supported the inference of a conspiracy,
particularly "when uncontradicted and with no more explanation than
the record affords." 14
4
It seems evident that the Court believed that communications among
the distributors actually occurred even though no one testified to their
content. The defendants called as witnesses local managers who
testified that "they did not have conferences or reach agreements with
the other distributors," but the defendants' failure to call officers who
actually had authority to set prices raised the inference that those
officers would have testified to the contrary. 145 Because all of the
distributors knew the nature of the proposal before them, the inferred
communications must have related to details of the proposal and
whether the distributors could rely on each other to act uniformly. The
Court observed that:
[w]hile as a result of independent negotiations either of the two
restrictions without the other could have been put into effect by any
one or more of the distributors and in any one or more of the Texas
cities served by Interstate, the negotiations which ensued and which in
fact did result in modifications of the proposals resulted in
substantially unanimous action of the distributors, both as to the terms
of the restrictions and in the selection of the four cities where they
were to operate. 146
The Court may have meant to suggest by this passage that indirect
communication occurred during the negotiations when the exhibitors'
representatives relayed the positions of the various distributors. The
evidence was sufficient at least to raise that inference in the absence of
testimony by the representatives of the distributors who actually
conducted the negotiations. The Court "decline[d] to speculate whether
142. Id. at 214-20.
143. Id. at 222.
144. Id. at 225.
145. Id. at 226.
146. Id. at 222.
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there may have been other and more legitimate reasons for such action
not disclosed by the record.- 147
In an alternate holding, the Court held that, even if the government
had not produced sufficient evidence to infer a conventional agreement
among the distributors, it would have won because it showed concerted
action following the invitation to participate in the arrangement: "It was
enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and
invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and
participated in it. Each distributor was advised that the others were
asked to participate; each knew that cooperation was essential to
successful operation of the plan." 148  This language describes a so-
called hub-and-spokes conspiracy, in which the distributors assent not
to each other, but only to the exhibitor. But it also seems to suggest that
action pursuant to the proposal is necessary for the arrangement to be
shown. Similarly, in Paramount Pictures, the Supreme Court held that
an agreement may be shown where "a concert of action is contemplated
and.., defendants conformed to that arrangement." 149
Recall that Black distinguishes concerted action from agreement.
The parties form an agreement by exchanging promises; they engage in
a concerted practice by communicating and then act consistently with
the communications. 150  While American courts typically use
"concerted action" interchangeably with "agreement," Interstate Circuit
appears to recognize concerted action as a species of agreement that
requires the concurrence of both a plan and an action in accordance with
the plan. Evidently this sort of agreement is different from those the
Supreme Court had in mind in Madison Oil, which held that illegal
price fixing occurs when the parties agree, regardless of whether the
agreement is successful or even possible to implement. 151  Madison
147. Id. at 225. In Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000), the court affirmed
the Commission's finding that a toy retailer had induced its suppliers to form a horizontal boycott
of warehouse clubs that were undercutting the defendant's retail prices. Although Monsanto
required that there be evidence that "tends to exclude the possibility" of independent action, the
court noted that it does not require the plaintiff to exclude that possibility entirely. Id. at 934-35.
The court found sufficient evidence to support the finding of agreement, essentially following
Interstate Circuit. It pointed particularly to evidence that rather than becoming more dependent
on Toys "R" Us, the companies wanted to diversify from it. Moreover, "each manufacturer was
afraid to curb its sales to the warehouse clubs alone, because it was afraid its rivals would cheat
and gain a special advantage in that popular new market niche." Id. at 936.
148. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 226.
149. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948).
150. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 166-69.
151. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (stating that
"a conspiracy to fix prices violates § 1 . though no overt act is shown, though it is not
established that the conspirators had the means available for the accomplishment of their
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Oil's concept of agreement, drawn from the law of criminal conspiracy,
could be satisfied by what the cases sometimes call a "traditional
conspiracy," 152 in which the parties exchange mutual assurances in a
hotel room or over the phone. Such an agreement would be unlawful,
even if it never came to fruition. Interstate Circuit, in contrast, suggests
that something less than a completed agreement need not pass between
the defendants to establish that subsequent parallel actions are
concerted. This language seems to endorse the notion that concerted
action may be shown by communication of a plan followed by parallel
action pursuant to the plan.
B. Characterizing and Proving the Necessary Communications
Including communication of intentions and reliance in the definition
of concerted action does not tell us what sorts of communications
satisfy the definition, nor does it tell us what evidence would be
sufficient to prove that the requisite communications had taken place.
Even when there is direct evidence of communications, it will be
necessary to determine whether they carry the necessary import.
Because the forms and degrees of communication are virtually infinite,
and may not even be verbal, 153 this task will recur in every case and
will require difficult choices. Moreover, in cases in which the direct
evidence of communications does not by itself satisfy the definition, it
will still be necessary to infer from circumstantial evidence whether the
requisite communications occurred. Nevertheless, recognizing the
necessity of communication of a certain kind in concerted action can
narrow the focus of the analysis. There will be many contexts in which
the model has implications, but I will focus on public announcements of
future prices and on private exchanges of price information.
1. Public Announcements
Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfield's gas station hypothetical illustrates
how public price announcements might produce a coordinated price
increase. Although this scenario involves communication of individual
pricing intentions, the communications do not convey the requisite
information with anything like the degree of certainty to satisfy the
objective").
152. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004).
153. Werden, supra note 15, at 765. Werden describes cases in which "'competitors
communicated using something akin to language, but they never directly addressed each other,
nor did they use words as such." Id. Nevertheless "the communication did not consist of taking,
or publicizing, marketplace actions such as the building of capacity, the production of output, or
the charging of particular prices." Id.
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proposed model. The parties may act in reliance on each other's doing
likewise and may have a common goal, but, in the absence of other
cues, they have not communicated their reliance on others' actions and
a common goal in any meaningful sense. 154  To interpret them as
satisfying the requirement would erase any distinction between
conscious parallelism and concerted action. Worse, it would deter
communication not only with rivals but also with the entire market,
communication that is as necessary to competition as it is to
interdependent pricing. To qualify as a communication of reliance and
goals concerning prices, a public announcement would have to be far
more explicit than a bare posting of a price.
In Petroleum Products, the court suggested in dicta that gasoline
refiners' public announcements of increases in wholesale prices and
withdrawals of dealer discounts would support an inference of
conspiracy, because the actions made it easier for firms to coordinate
price increases. 155 The court cited the first edition of Richard Posner's
Antitrust Law for the proposition that "the form of the exchange-
whether through a trade association, through private exchange as in
Container, or through public announcements of price changes-should
not be determinative of its legality."' 156 Instead, legality should turn on
whether "the exchange promotes collusive rather than competitivepricing.'"157
These statements alone could be read to suggest that the Petroleum
Products court would hold that the gas station hypothetical constitutes
concerted action. The court emphasized, however, that because all of
the defendants sold through franchised dealers, there was no obvious
competitive benefit in publishing wholesale prices. Consumers had no
interest in knowing the prices. Indeed, there was evidence that the
publication of prices was intended to communicate primarily with
154. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,253, at 97,671 (E.D.
Mich. 1974) (noting that a public price announcement "cannot be twisted into an invitation or
signal to conspire"). Similarly, cf. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d
1028, 1042 (8th Cir. 2000) ("In the absence of express agreements, oligopolists must rely on
uncertain and ambiguous signals to achieve concerted action. The signals are subject to
misinterpretation and are a blunt and imprecise means of ensuring smooth cooperation, especially
in the context of changing or unprecedented market circumstances. This anticompetitive minuet is
most difficult to compose and to perform, even for a disciplined oligopoly.") (citing Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227-28 (1993)).
155. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d
432, 445-50 (9th Cir. 1990).
156. Id. at 447 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
146 (1976)).
157. Id. at 447.
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rivals. 158  Most important, the court added in a footnote that its
"conclusion would necessarily be different were the appellants'
inference of a price-fixing conspiracy based on the dissemination or
advertising of retail prices; permitting an inference of conspiracy from
such evidence would make it more difficult for retail consumers to get
the information they need to make efficient market decisions." 159
It is not clear what the court means by this last qualification. If the
court really endorsed Posner's assertion that it does not matter whether
communications are public or private, it would seem that the usefulness
of the information to consumers should not defeat an inference of
conspiracy where the pricing is anticompetitive. The court may have
been suggesting that the benefit to consumers raised the plaintiff's
burden of production. As in Matsushita, where conduct is "the essence
of competition," courts should not permit easy inferences of illegality.
Alternatively, the court may have been suggesting that the fact that
information is intended only for one audience can change its import,
and thus its appropriate legal effect. If so, the court's distinction is
relevant to my suggestion that a public announcement of pricing
information that is relevant to multiple audiences is less likely to convey
the element of reliance on others acting in a certain way. The only way
a public announcement could convey the requisite information would be
if the circumstances of other communications provide clarifying cues.
This condition would be satisfied most obviously if the rivals had
arranged a code in which the critical information would be triggered by
superficially innocuous public announcements.
160
2. Private Exchanges of Price Information
As Carlton, Gertner, and Rosenfield have recognized, private
communications among rivals are more suspicious than public
announcements. In some instances, private communications will be so
explicit they will constitute direct evidence of an agreement. In others,
they will be considered along with other circumstantial evidence
tending to show concerted action. In both instances, the significance of
158. Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 448 ("[T]he public dissemination of such information
served little purpose other than to facilitate interdependent or collusive price coordination.").
159. Id. at448n.14.
160. For example, the station owners might, by prearrangement, established a system in which
prices posed as $2.99 8/1o rather than $2.99 9/jo would be a signal indicating reliance on a similar
posting. This hypothetical is based on an alleged conspiracy described in Werden, supra note 15,
at 766, in which bidders communicated a request that rivals withdraw bids in certain lots by using
coded bid amounts on other lots.
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the communications will depend in part on the definition of concerted
action.
Direct evidence of agreement sweeps away all of the limitations of
Matsushita and creates a jury issue. The only question about this sort of
evidence is its credibility, which the jury is best situated to evaluate:
"[N]o inferences are required from direct evidence to establish a fact
and thus a court need not be concerned about the reasonableness of the
inferences to be drawn from such evidence." 161 This sort of evidence
necessarily consists of communications, 162 but not all communications
about prices amount to direct evidence. 163 Evidence is only direct if it
spells out the terms of the communications, which in turn meet the
definition of agreement. Evidence of a completed verbal agreement
through the testimony of immunized conspirators is almost invariably
required for a criminal prosecution.164
Even if evidence of a completed verbal agreement is not available,
evidence of private communications can contribute to an inference of
161. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir.
1993). The court continued that the focus "in Matsushita was on ambiguous evidence, and what
inferences reasonably could be drawn from that type of evidence." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). See also Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1300 (1 1th
Cir. 2003) ("In the unusual case where the plaintiff is able to muster direct evidence of price
fixing, summary judgment is categorically inappropriate."); Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 441
(holding that the court must deny summary judgment if plaintiff offers direct evidence of
conspiracy). But cf Sylvester v. SOS Children's Villages Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir.
2006) (observing that "actually all evidence, even eyewitness testimony, requires drawing
inferences"); Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006)
(reserving the question of whether weak direct evidence, in itself insufficient to raise a jury issue,
always "remove[s the] case from the Matsushita framework").
162. United States v. Therm-All, Inc., 323 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2004) (detailed testimony of
conversations spelling out terms and mechanism of price-fixing agreement were sufficient to
support a conviction, despite circumstantial evidence of continued competition in the market);
United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2002).
163. In re Citric Acid Litig., 996 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (meetings of rivals were not
direct evidence of conspiracy in the absence of explicit evidence of agreement). See also In re
High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that direct
evidence of conspiracy "is evidence tantamount to an acknowledgment of guilt" and that
circumstantial evidence of conspiracy "is everything else including ambiguous statements").
164. But cf United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1339 (4th Cir. 1979) (affirming a
conviction for commission rate fixing based on inconclusive conversations about future prices
followed by consistent action); United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,453 (D. Or. 1975), affid, 557 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming conviction for bid
rigging based on meetings followed by a suspicious pattern of bidding), both discussed in
Werden, supra note 15, at 747. Even with such high standards of prosecutorial discretion,
defendants in criminal antitrust who choose to go to trial are acquitted far more frequently than
other criminal defendants. F. Joseph Warin, David P. Burns, and John W.F. Chesley, To Plead or
Not to Plead?, Reviewing a Decade of Criminal Antitrust Trials, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, July
2006, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/06/07/JulO6-Warin7=20f.pdf.
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concerted action. 165 Consider a hypothetical posed in Esco Corp. v.
United States166 over four decades ago:
Let us suppose five competitors meet on several occasions, discuss
their problems, and one finally states-"I won't fix prices with any of
you, but here is what I am going to do- put the price of my gidget at X
dollars; now you all do what you want." He then leaves the meeting.
Competitor number two says-"I don't care whether number one does
what he says he's going to do or not; nor do I care what the rest of you
do, but I am going to price my gidget at X dollars." Number three
makes a similar statement-"My price is X dollars." Number four
says not one word. All leave and fix "their" prices at "X" dollars.
167
The court concluded that these facts would raise but not compel an
inference of concerted action. Mere statements of intention would be
insufficient to establish an agreement simply on the basis of what the
parties said. The jury would have to decide if the parties had formed an
agreement based on "evidence as to what these competitors had done
before such meeting, and what actions they took thereafter, or what
actions they did not take." 168 The court discussed the definition of
agreement and identified the sort of communications that would be
necessary to establish an agreement when rivals have engaged in
parallel conduct. An agreement required "mutual consent," according
to the court, but not necessarily "an exchange of assurances to take or
refrain from a given course of conduct." 169 It would be sufficient that
one rival suggests a course of conduct "in the presence of other
competitors" and all follow it "generally and customarily and
continuously for all practical purposes, even though there be slight
variations." 170 Thus, even competitor number four in the court's
hypothetical might be held liable, without communicating anything
verbally, so long as the course of conduct suggests that he was
conveying a participation in the larger conspiracy.
The court's discussion of its hypothetical is broadly consistent with
the distinction between concerted action and a complete verbal
agreement. Viewed in isolation from their context, the rivals' words in
165. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 241 (1996) (suggesting that a jury
may find concerted action based on "uniform behavior among competitors, preceded by
conversations implying that later uniformity might prove desirable").
166. 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965).
167. Id. at 1007. Cf. WHINSTON, supra note 85, at 20 (observing that the law distinguishes
cases in which the parties merely state their intentions form cases in which they communicate
assent, but "economists have essentially nothing to say about this").
168. Esco, 340 F.2d at 1007.
169. Id. at 1007-08.
170. Id. at 1008.
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the hypothetical do nothing more than announce their intentions with
respect to future prices. But the announcement of the prices at a secret
meeting of rivals indicates that the first rival is proposing a common
course of action, and the other statements at the meeting and the
subsequent conduct of the rivals could allow a jury to infer that the
communications conveyed the requisite elements of reliance.
The most problematic feature of the court's hypothetical is "number
four," who says nothing at the meeting, but follows the proposed price.
The profit-maximizing price for a fringe firm in a market in which other
firms have formed a cartel is the cartel price. If actions that are profit
maximizing for a price-taking firm are to be found sufficient to form an
agreement, the reasons should be explained much more fully. Black
addresses the related example in which one firm tells another that it will
raise prices if the other goes first, and the other responds by raising
prices, which are then matched. 171 He acknowledges the possibility that
a more relaxed form of the model might encompass this scenario, but
suggests that allowing that exception would make it more difficult to
distinguish oligopoly pricing. Even if one accepts Black's more
restrictive view, however, one might still argue that number four should
be liable if the circumstances indicate that its actions manifest the
requisite information. For example, one might argue that, in the context
of the industry, number four's very attendance at a series of secret
meetings at which rivals communicate intentions, and (implicitly)
reliance, is itself a communication of intent and reliance.
These considerations are relevant to the issue of proof of concerted
action. In the Esco hypothetical, for example, the fact that the
communications occur at a private meeting rather than in public
announcements of future price actions makes it more likely that a
variety of contextual cues could convey the elements of reliance. The
fact that the statements are about future prices also weighs in favor of an
inference of concerted action, because they provide knowledge and a
basis for reliance on others' actions. Finally, as the court in Esco noted,
the significance of various statements at the meeting depends upon
whether the exercise is repeated. Carlton, et al., suggest this sort of one-
way communication might be sufficient to violate the rule of reason in
circumstances in which one of the parties had established a reputation
for reliability in matters of pricing. 172 The same considerations might
justify an inference of concerted action.
171. BLACK, supra note 1, at 161.
172. Id.
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A more challenging case is secret, repeated communications about
prices in completed transactions. In Blomkest, perhaps the most
controversial case alleging concerted action in recent years, the
plaintiffs pointed to, among other evidence, a pattern of price
verification calls among the defendants about the prices at which recent
sales had occurred. 173 The majority found this evidence insufficient to
raise a jury issue of collusion, because "a conspiracy to fix a price
would involve one company communicating with another company
before the price quotation to the customer." 174  Consequently, the
plaintiffs' argument "assumes a conspiracy first, and then sets out to
'prove' it." 175  The majority is certainly correct that the verification
calls do not form an agreement in themselves. Nor do they satisfy the
communication requirement in the proposed model, because they do not
convey intent to achieve a common goal or reliance on one's rival to do
the same. 176 The dissent observed, however, that the "communications
are not supposed to be direct evidence of a one-time mini-conspiracy to
fix the price on one sale. Rather, they are circumstantial evidence of a
type of behavior one would not expect in the absence of a[]
[preexisting] agreement to cooperate."' 177 Thus, according to the
dissent, the communications permitted an inference of a broader
conspiracy, presumably involving other communications, because they
revealed confidential information about discounts, something no firm
would do absent participation in a cartel. More provocatively, the
dissent may have been suggesting that tacit coordination reinforced by
periodic communication to assure compliance should satisfy the
agreement requirement.
C. Communication and Concerted Action in Recent Cases
We have seen that antitrust law has not yet defined "concerted
action" in sufficiently meaningful terms to guide courts and juries.
Antitrust law is not unique in leaving key terms largely undefined. To
some degree, the common law process requires courts to adapt
standards to new fact patterns, drawing on theoretical, political, and
173. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000).
174. Id. at 1034.
175. Id. at 1033.
176. Similarly, it is not quite accurate to say "[c]ajoling competitors into adhering to their
posted price lists, or reprimanding them when they steal sales, is not conscious parallelism; it is
collusion." HoVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 135. It may be circumstantial evidence of collusion,
but it is collusion as a matter of law. Hovenkamp clarifies the point in the next sentence, stating
that the evidence of structure and communications was "more than enough to create an inference
of agreement." Id.
177. Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1047 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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other societal changes in directing the lines of liability. Pragmatic
judges prefer the flexibility that vagueness provides. Nevertheless, it
can become apparent at some point in the evolution of the law that an
unarticulated structure of concepts is informing the courts in their
shaping of standards. By bringing that structure to the surface, it may
be possible to clarify key terminology and perhaps contribute to greater
predictability and consistency in decision-making.
The lower courts' post-Matsushita cases continue typically to quote
the received definitions of agreement and the conventional plus factors
formula. But their applications of the received formulas reveal that they
have been guided by a more specific standard that requires
communication. As we have seen, courts invariably focus on
communications when the plaintiff seeks to prove the agreement by
direct evidence. But the focus on communication is also evident in
cases involving circumstantial evidence of concerted action. In the
search for evidence that tends to exclude independent action, courts
have focused primarily on evidence tending to suggest communication
has occurred. Although some cases do not involve testimony or
documents detailing communications, the courts nevertheless require
proof that they conclude justifies an inference that communications took
place. In essence, there is no longer an open-ended plus factors
analysis; the only evidence that actually distinguishes interdependent
and concerted action is evidence that tends to show that the defendants
have communicated in the requisite ways.
To illustrate this trend, I will discuss three recent court of appeals
decisions, the Seventh Circuit's High Fructose Corn Syrup decision in
2002,178 the Eleventh Circuit's Williamson Oil decision in 2003,179 and
the Third Circuit's Flat Glass decision in 2004.180 In Fructose, the
court found the evidence of concerted action sufficient to raise a jury
question; in Williamson, the court found the evidence insufficient; and
in Flat Glass, the court found the evidence sufficient as to one alleged
conspiracy and insufficient as to another. Each case turned on whether
there was evidence tending to show communications between
defendants of the requisite form and content.
1. High Fructose Corn Syrup
Judge Posner's opinion in Fructose refers obliquely to his long-
standing expansive interpretation of the reach of section 1: the
178. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
179. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (1lth Cir. 2003).
180. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004).
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statutory language is broad enough .... to encompass a purely tacit
agreement to fix prices, that is, an agreement made without any actual
communication among the parties to the agreement. If a firm raises
price in the expectation that its competitors will do likewise, and they
do, the firm's behavior can be conceptualized as the offer of a
unilateral contract that the offerees accept by raising their prices. 1
8 1
Such an interpretation would collapse interdependent and concerted
action, treating the gas stations in our hypothetical as a cartel.
Recognizing that courts, particularly since Matsushita, have decisively
rejected any such interpretation, Posner grudgingly conceded that "it is
generally believed . . . that an express, manifested agreement, and thus
an agreement involving actual, verbalized communication, must be
proved in order for a price-fixing conspiracy to be actionable under the
Sherman Act." 18 2 Although such an agreement can be proven by direct
testimony, it can also be proven by "economic evidence suggesting that
the defendants were not in fact competing, and noneconomic evidence
suggesting that they were not competing because they had agreed not to
compete." 183 Notice that, in this formulation, economic evidence shows
only interdependence; noneconomic evidence is crucial to proof of
concerted action, defined by "actual, verbalized communication."
Because noneconomic evidence of collusion tends to be testimony
about conversations, motivations, and other facts bearing on the issue of
agreement, the usual rules governing the assessment of this kind of
evidence at the summary judgment stage applied. For example, Judge
Posner rejected as a basis for summary judgment the uncontradicted but
"self-serving, uncorroborated, [and] implausible"' 84 testimony of one of
the defendants' executives, because the jury was free to disbelieve it.
He also noted that so long as bits of evidence are not wholly without
weight on the issue of agreement, they should not be rejected simply
because each one is insufficient to avoid summary judgment; they
should be considered as a whole. 185 Finally, Posner distinguished
evidence of conspiracy from evidence of its efficacy. The defendants
argued evidence that transaction prices departed from list prices
181. Fructose, 295 F.3d at 654. See also POSNER, supra note 6, at 94 ("[One seller
communicates his 'offer' by restricting output, and the offer is 'accepted' by the actions of his
rivals in restricting their outputs as well.").
182. Fructose, 295 F.3d at 654. He also said the element agreement required "an explicit,
manifested agreement rather than a purely tacit meeting of the minds." Id. at 654-55.
183. Id. at 655.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 655-61 (stating that courts must avoid supposing that "if no single item of evidence
presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally to conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot
defeat summary judgment").
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disproved the existence of agreement. Posner recognized that mere
identity of list prices would not be evidence of agreement even if
transaction prices were the same; but the fact that transaction prices
were different did not contradict noneconomic evidence of an
agreement to fix list prices, which is per se illegal. 186
Posner found that the economic evidence showed the market was
conducive to secret price fixing. He explained that it would be
impractical to police by surreptitious communications markets with
many sellers, heterogeneous products, and few buyers, because the High
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) market was concentrated and the product
homogeneous, "elaborate communications, quick to be detected, would
not have been necessary to enable pricing to be coordinated" and
cheating to be unmasked. The fact that some HFCS was manufactured
using corn provided by customers complicated the problem of fixing
prices, but apparently not insurmountably. The existence of a few large
buyers also did not prevent price fixing, because sellers could conspire
to discriminate in price, exploiting the smaller buyers. 187
Posner also reviewed the evidence of noncompetitive conduct and
found it consistent with price fixing. Parallel price changes in the
proportion of the prices of the two grades of HFCS were not explained
by the proportional difference in sweetness. Parallel changes in the
terms of contracts to the detriment of consumers without a
compensating change in price were also noncompetitive. Most
suggestively, the defendants bought HFCS from each other to supply
contracts, even though it would have been less costly to produce the
marginal units themselves. Finally, market shares remained stable
during the alleged conspiracy period, despite changes in demand. The
plaintiff produced, and the court admitted, a regression analysis tending
to show that economic variables affecting the price of the product did
not account for the price increases during the alleged conspiracy period;
the defendant's economic testimony did not entirely discredit these
studies. 188
Although this evidence showed that the defendants "tacitly agreed
not to compete" it was insufficient to avoid summary judgment, because
"the plaintiffs must prove that there was an actual, manifest agreement
not to compete." Posner found that a collection of bits of
"noneconomic" evidence supported that inference.
186. Id. at 656.
187. Id. at 656-58. The court found that the Fructose situation was one with "some large and
some small buyers." Id. at 658.
188. Id. at658-61.
2007]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
One of the defendants' plant managers said, "We have an
understanding within the industry not to undercut each other's
prices." 189
One of the defendants' documents stated it would "support efforts to
limit [HFCS] pricing to a quarterly basis."' 190
The president of one defendant said "our competitors are our friends.
Our customers are the enemy." Another said "competitors[']
happiness is at least as important as customers['] happiness." 19 1
A director of one of the defendants said "every business I'm in is an
organization," 192 apparently industry jargon for a cartel.
An executive of ADM referred to a "deal" to "fuck [Coca-Cola] over"
and to an "understanding between the companies that.., causes us not
to... make irrational decisions." 193 He compared ADM and Cargill
to Japanese firms that many believe fix prices.
A defendant's document expressed concern about "entry of new
entrants (barriers) and [whether they] will they play by the rules
(discipline)."' 194
An ADM executive who was convicted of price fixing in other
markets expressed concern that another rival might have been "hit" in
an FBI raid when ADM was. The same executive took charge of
ADM's HFCS operation at the same time the noncompetitive behavior
in the industry became prevalent. That executive and another
convicted ADM executive asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege
when asked questions about HFCS, creating an adverse inference of
conspiracy that was admissible against ADM. 195
Posner concluded that evidence was "highly suggestive of the
existence of an explicit though of course covert agreement to fix prices"
and thus even though it was "not conclusive" and there were
"alternative interpretations of every bit of it," it was sufficient for "a
reasonable jury to infer that the agreement to fix prices was express
rather than tacit." 196
This passage strikingly displays Posner's adoption (at least for
purposes of the case) of a demanding definition of agreement, but a
relaxed burden of production for the plaintiff on the issue of agreement.
He stressed at several points that any agreement must have involved
189. Id. at 660.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 663.
196. Id.
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secret communications to reach consensus on list prices. Nevertheless,
he accepted an assortment of cryptic statements that there was an
"understanding," or "rules," or an "organization" in the industry as
sufficient evidence that such a consensus was reached. Superficially
and individually, all of these terms are ambiguous and could be
interpreted to mean only interdependent action. Together, they were
sufficient.
Posner did not distinguish concerted action from a completed verbal
agreement. Perhaps he thought it was not necessary to do so for
purposes of the case, because he believed the evidence referred to an
"organization," an explicit (though secret) cartel. It is easy to see why
the Antitrust Division did not bring criminal charges against the
defendants for their actions in this market. As we have seen, a criminal
case almost invariably requires detailed accounts of specific
conversations (through immunized witnesses or surveillance tapes) in
which each participant expresses acceptance of a proposed course of
action. Although the Antitrust Division was able to meet that standard
in some segments of the grain industry, 197 it failed in HFCS,
presumably because there were no accounts of any specific
communications. 198 Nevertheless, in the context of an industry in
which imprisoned executives asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege, it
was reasonable to read the statements in a more sinister light for
purposes of a civil case. That industry usage suggested, although it did
not specify, communications within the framework of a conventional
clandestine cartel.
2. Williamson Oil
In Williamson Oil,199 cigarette wholesalers alleged that Philip Morris
had orchestrated an industry-wide price increase by means that
amounted to concerted action. Philip Morris had tried various
ineffective measures to counter the effects of discount brands on the
prices and market share of its premium products. Finally, in a bold
stroke, Philip Morris cut the price of its dominant Marlboro brand by 40
cents per pack and announced it would not increase the prices of its
premium brands for the foreseeable future. Several months later, it
extended the price cuts to its other premium brands. It also cut the price
of discount brands and increased the price of its deep discount brands,
197. These conspiracies are the subject of KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT: A TRUE
STORY (Broadway Books 2000).
198. Posner recognized that "the evidence in this case probably is not strong enough to
establish the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Fructose, 295 F.3d at 664.
199. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (1lth Cir. 2003).
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thus simplifying its price structure and narrowing the differences among
them. The rest of the industry matched the price cuts.
20 0
The plaintiffs alleged that manufacturers coordinated a series of price
increases by an elaborate system of "signaling." According to the
plaintiffs, Philip Morris's drastic price cut, called "Marlboro Friday,"
"constructively informed its competitors that price discounting to gain
market share would no longer be tolerated, and that only when such
efforts were abandoned, and the premium/discount price gap narrowed,
could prices again rise." 20 1 Other cigarette manufacturers responded by
expressing displeasure with the price war in the trade press. Philip
Morris then accepted this "offer" by limiting wholesalers' allocations,
heralding the desired price increase. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco (RJR), a
competitor, then announced price increases in both premium and
discount brands, thus maintaining the narrow gap between premium and
discount brands, and the other manufacturers followed. More industry
price increases followed, some allegedly against the interests of some of
the manufacturers, and each accomplished by "credit memos" to
wholesalers that functioned as signaling mechanisms. 20 2  The
manufacturers also "exchang[ed] sales data through a common
consultant .. . to ensure that all were adhering to their allocation
programs and to detect and punish" defectors from the agreement.20 3
The manufacturers responded by noting that while wholesale prices
increased, manufacturers were investing heavily in retail promotions
like coupons. Moreover, the increases were few and did not bring
wholesale prices to pre-Marlboro Friday levels for several years. As
evidence of continued competition, they noted that market shares
changed significantly during the supposed conspiracy period.20 4
The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the evidence
revealed "signaling" that amounted to a plus factor. The court viewed
these actions as "communications with the market," which oligopolists
could legitimately monitor to formulate their strategies. "Antitrust law
permits such discussions" because "dissemination of pricing
information" can have economic benefits. 20 5 The purported signaling
200. Id. at 1292.
201. Id. at 1293.
202. Id. at 1294.
203. Id. at 1295-96.
204. Id. at 1294.
205. Id. at 1305; see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1974 WL 926 at 21 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 16, 1974) ("The public announcement of a pricing decision cannot be twisted into an
invitation or signal to conspire; it is instead an economic reality to which all other competitors
must react.").
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merely "return[ed] the tobacco industry from the pricing chaos that
followed Marlboro Friday to a 'traditional normal oligopoly.'
20 6
Marlboro Friday itself, including the commitment to keep prices low,
was an "exceptionally competitive move."20 7 The Supreme Court in
Brooke Group rejected any rule of above-cost predatory pricing because
"discouraging a price cut and forcing firms to maintain
supracompetitive prices, thus depriving consumers of the benefits of
lower prices in the interim, does not constitute sound antitrust
policy." 20 8 To characterize price-cutting as a signal for a price-fixing
conspiracy would create similar perverse incentives.
The subsequent response of other cigarette manufacturers to raise
prices without re-widening the gap between discount and premium
brands was also "rational pricing behavior 20 9 because Philip Morris
had made clear to all by Marlboro Friday that it would match the
discount prices and undercut the premium prices. The comment of a
rival executive that his company had "no wish to escalate" 2 10 the price
war could not reasonably be interpreted as a signal, particularly when
taken in context of the executive's entire statement, which emphasized
his firm's exercise of tactical judgment.
The statement of another executive to stock analysts that his company
"intend[ed] to pursue options other than price" on discount cigarettes
was likewise innocuous when viewed in context because it simply
acknowledged the narrowed gap between premium and discount
brands.211 Nor was Philip Morris's announcement of an allocation
program limiting the volume of product that wholesalers could buy
viewed as a signal that a price increase was in the offing because it was
a legitimate way to prevent "loading" by wholesalers at the lower
price.2 12 Finally, Philip Morris's rivals did not signal acceptance of a
plan of concerted action by raising discount and premium prices by the
same amounts because they knew any attempt to widen the gap between
the tiers would continue the price war.
213
The rivals also, through an independent management services firm,
exchanged information that tracked information on wholesale to retail
206. Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1306.
207. Id.
208. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223-24
(1995).
209. Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1307.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1308-09.
212. Id. at 1309.
213. Id. at 1309-10.
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sales and shipments, but not on prices. Philip Morris had developed the
system with the firm, then later allowed its rivals to participate, with
each rival sharing the cost of the service and its sales information. The
court found that the independent benefit of sharing costs was as good an
explanation for the arrangement as facilitating the monitoring of the
conspiracy. 214  It was also in the individual interests of the firms
because each firm had an interest in "keeping tabs" on its rivals.
215
Sharing one's information was a condition of gaining access to rivals'
information:
If a particular manufacturer ceased providing its own information, its
entitlement to that of its competitors would similarly end. To draw an
analogy, each company's willingness to give its own information can
be viewed as the ante in a poker game. To ante is irrational only if
there is no legitimate reason why one would be playing the game; yet
here, the game is oligopolistic competition, which everyone concedes
is lawful, and the ante is perfectly consonant with the desire to
play.216
This language should not be read as approving information
exchanges by rivals to overcome practical difficulties in coordinating
price increases. Participating in such an arrangement is evidently an
agreement to exchange information. But it would only be the basis for
inferring concerted action if the information exchanged involved
communication of reliance on rivals' pricing behavior, or at least
suggested that such exchanges had occurred. Because the information
exchanged in Williamson Oil did not include pricing data, it was far less
suspicious.
If we place Williamson Oil alongside Fructose, the meaning of
communication in the definition and proof of agreement becomes
clearer. In Fructose, although there was no evidence of any specific
communication, Judge Posner expressly applied a definition of
agreement that required communications of a particular kind-secret
communications aimed at reaching agreement on list prices-and found
sufficient evidence of such an agreement in the form of references to
"understandings" and an "organization" in a segment of an industry in
which other segments were admittedly cartelized. In Williamson Oil,
214. Id. at 1313.
215. Id.; see also In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
defendant's participation in an association that required sharing of information in return for
aggregate sales and production data was in the defendant's individual interest).
216. Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1313. The district court also found that the firms did not
negotiate and agree on modifications of the information provided; the services firm considered
each proposal for changes separately. Id. at 1315. The court rejected as a plus factor the tobacco
industry's history of price fixing. Id. at 1317-1318.
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there was a great deal of evidence of communication, but the court
concluded that there was insufficient evidence of concerted action to
create an issue for the jury. In reaching this result, the Eleventh Circuit
purported to apply the conventional, if meaningless, "meeting of minds"
definition of agreement rather than Judge Posner's more concrete
definition that required communication of a particular sort.
Nevertheless, it is apparent in Williamson Oil the court was implicitly
applying a standard that required at least communication of intent and
reliance.2 17
This more exacting definition is apparent in the court's rejection of
the plaintiffs' purported evidence of signaling. The Marlboro Friday
price cut did not qualify as a signal because it was a communication
with the market, not a direct (or mediated) communication between
manufacturers; consequently, it was impossible to attribute to it the sort
of definite assertion of future pricing intentions and reliance on the
actions of others. The statements to the press by executives about their
expectations about the market were likewise too ambiguous about future
pricing intentions and their dependence on the actions of others to meet
the definition of concerted action. The information exchange
arrangement, which did not convey prices but aggregated sales and
shipment data, could not have conveyed the information necessary for
agreement and was not sufficiently specific to police a preexisting
agreement. In all of these instances, the court was evidently looking for
communications that could convincingly convey the sort of information
about pricing intentions and reliance.
217. See also In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999), in which the court
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant despite evidence of exchange of price information
among rivals. The court characterized the exchanges as "sporadic exchanges of shop talk among
field sales representatives who lacked pricing authority . I..." Id  at 125. To meet the plaintiffs
burden of production, the information exchanges must "rise to the level of an agreement, tacit or
otherwise." Id. at 126. This was not shown, according to the court. There was also a suggestion
in one internal memo that the parties had reached a "truce," but the same document described
"aggressive competition." Id. at 127. The court also found that the rivals' pricing decisions were
different over 80 percent of the time. Id. at 128. The result in the case was probably correct, but
the reasoning was unnecessarily vague, particularly in the description of the nature of the
communications that would be required to show concerted action. Mere exchanges of current
price data among employees without pricing authority do not allow an inference that the
interlocutors conveyed their reliance on one another's actions. See also Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc.
v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000) reversing en banc, 176 F.3d 1055
(8th Cir. 1992), in which a narrow majority of the court held that evidence of exchange of price
verification information was an insufficient basis for inferring an agreement to fix prices.
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3. Flat Glass
Flat Glass, the most recent important case on proof of concerted
action, is of particular interest, first because of the court's focused
discussion of the nature of plus factors, and, second, because of the
court's revealing application of that analysis to two alleged conspiracies
in the glass industry. Although the court applied the plus factors
framework, it implicitly required evidence tending to show
communications of intentions and reliance. Tellingly, it characterized
the factors as "proxies for direct evidence of an agreement.- 2 18 As we
have seen, direct evidence requires unambiguous testimony of
conversations spelling out the communications.
The court listed as plus factors "(1) evidence that the defendant had a
motive to enter into a price fixing conspiracy; (2) evidence that the
defendant acted contrary to its interests; and (3) 'evidence implying a
traditional conspiracy.' 219 It then characterized the first two in this list
as "neither necessary nor sufficient" 220 to create a jury issue because
they rarely do more than "restate the phenomenon of interdependence"
in parallel pricing cases.221 As we have already seen, rivals have a
motive to form a cartel whenever their industry's structure makes it
possible, but that same structure also makes purely interdependent
action more likely to be possible. Similarly, if the market is structured
in a way that permits interdependence, increasing prices in hopes that
others will do the same may well be in a firm's long-run individual
interest.
Strikingly, however, the court exempted from its caution concerning
the probative value of the first two factors "non-price" actions against
self-interest that facilitate price coordination. The only example of this
sort of evidence the court offered was "apparently unilateral exchanges
of confidential price information," which may be more probative of
agreement, because they "cannot simply be explained as a result of
oligopolistic interdependence." 222  Thus, the court viewed nonpublic
218. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004).
219. Id. (citing Petruzzi's v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1244 (3d Cir. 1993)).
220. Id. at 361 n.12.
221. Id. at 360.
222. Id. at 361 n.12. Interestingly, the court cited the dissent in Blomkest for this proposition.
Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1047 (8th Cir. 2000) (Gibson,
J., dissenting). In that case, the purportedly confidential information was the price of completed
transactions, something the dissent considered inexplicable other than as a means of policing
cheating. Id. See also In Re High Pressure Laminates Antitrust Litig., No. 00 MDL 1368(CLB),
2006 WL 1317023, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (holding that there was a permissible
inference that it "made no economic sense" for the defendant to possess cost data from one rival
and to fax it to another rival, unless there was a price fixing agreement).
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communications of pricing information, even if they do not amount to
direct evidence of conspiracy, as the primary form of action against
self-interest that may actually constitute a plus factor.
The only other plus factor the court identified as sufficient was
"evidence implying a traditional conspiracy," that is, quoting Judge
Posner in Fructose, "non-economic evidence 'that there was an actual,
manifest agreement not to compete.' '"223 This sort of evidence may
involve "'proof that the defendants got together and exchanged
assurances of common action or otherwise adopted a common plan even
though no meetings, conversations, or exchanged documents are
shown.' 224 This last passage, quoted from the Areeda and Hovenkamp
treatise, also places communications at the center of the inquiry,
although it clouds the point somewhat by implying that rivals may adopt
a common plan "otherwise" than by communication. If we set this
quibble to one side, the court's framing of the plus factors standard all
but stated that communication sufficient to convey the requisite
knowledge, common goals, and reliance is an element of concerted
action.
Its application of the plus factors analysis confirms this interpretation.
One class alleged that the defendants fixed the prices of flat glass and
another alleged they fixed the prices of automotive replacement glass.
The court found the evidence of alleged flat glass conspiracies sufficient
to create a jury issue and the evidence of the alleged replacement glass
conspiracy insufficient. The result in both cases hinged on the court's
interpretation of evidence of communication among the defendants.
The buyers of flat glass alleged that the manufacturers colluded in a
series of price increases over four years. All of the manufacturers
settled, except PPG Industries, who moved for summary judgment. The
Third Circuit concluded that the manufacturers had a motive to conspire
(because the industry was oligopolistic, with declining demand and
substantial excess capacity) and that there was evidence the defendants
had coordinated increases in list prices that were not justified by
changes in demand or cost.225 In addition, however, there was strong
evidence of "traditional conspiracy" among PPG's rivals-a submission
by one of them to the Antitrust Division seeking leniency that referred
to an "agreed upon, across the board price increase for the entire United
States."226 Although evidence that others in the industry had conspired
223. Flatglass, 385 F.3d at 361 (quoting Fructose, 295 F.3d at 661).
224. Id. at 361 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 80, at 1432(b), at 243).
225. Id. at 361-62.
226. Id. at 363.
20071
458 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 38
might be insufficient to avoid summary judgment in favor of a firm that
"mirrored" their actions, the evidence was relevant and sufficient when
considered together with evidence that PPG had joined the agreement.
Most of the evidence of PPG's involvement consisted of memos
referring to communications with rivals about upcoming price
increases.227 After an unsuccessful attempt by one rival to raise prices,
one of PPG's rivals held an internal meeting, whose minutes stated that
"there are indications that a price increase of approximately 8% would
hold. 228  Later, representatives of that same rival met with a PPG
executive. Two weeks later, PPG increased prices by the predicted 8%,
and others followed. Internal documents of PPG and another rival
suggested they knew in advance the increase would occur. Other
internal memos at first expressed satisfaction that the price increase had
been "implemented," but later memos complained that the increase
ultimately failed because some rivals did not "hold the line." 22 9
In another instance, one rival knew in advance of the exact date and
amount of another firm's planned price increase. Even though PPG
memos admitted that demand did not justify the increase, all rivals
increased prices within a week of each other.230  Other evidence
indicated rivals met at a trade meeting and one expressed "support" for
another's price increase proposal. In the last instance, rivals discussed
an upcoming price increase, and one took it into account in budgeting.
A rival then faxed to PPG a preannouncement copy of its planned price
changes. PPG increased its own prices by the same amount a week
before the planned increases and the rest of the firms in the industry
followed. After the increase, there were memos about 'holding firm'
and "stick[ing] to the rules." 231
Unlike an earlier Third Circuit decision in which evidence that firms
had copies of their rivals' internal memos was found to be innocuous, in
this instance the memos reflected high-level contacts and were
correlated with actual price increases. 232 Like Posner in Fructose, the
227. Id. at 364-67. For a similar case in which evidence suggested rivals had prior knowledge
of rivals' price increases and directly communicated about the need to increase margins, see In Re
High Pressure Laminates Antitrust Litig., No. 00 MDL 1368(CLB), 2006 WL 1317023, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006). The court there denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at
the close of the plaintiff's case. Id. at *5.
228. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 364.
229. Id. at 365.
230. Id. at 365-66.
231. Id. at 366-67.
232. Id. at 368 (discussing In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir.
1999)). Although the court did not discuss it, this consideration also distinguishes Blomkest
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 2000), in which the
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court emphasized that pieces of evidence could not be scrutinized
individually, but considered in their "totality" and in relation to one
another. 233  For example, the faxing of a prepublication list of
anticipated price increases gained significance because the recipient
increased prices by the same amount before the senders' prices went
into effect and the remaining firms followed.
In the alleged conspiracy to fix the price of automotive replacement
glass, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants fixed truckload prices by
reference to the retail prices suggested by NAGS, an independent
company. NAGS collected the truckload prices in the industry, selected
one as a benchmark, then applied a multiplier to determine the
suggested retail price. The glass manufacturers knew the multiplier,
and so were able to adjust their truckload prices to conform to the one
selected by NAGS. The court refused to infer a conspiracy in these
circumstances because publication of this sort of pricing information
could be procompetitive and actually benefit consumers. 234
The courts' analyses of the two conspiracies show not only the
central role of communications in the analysis, but that the form and
content that communications must have to be probative of concerted
action. In the flat glass conspiracy, evidence suggesting private, high-
level communications of impending price increases created a reasonable
inference of agreement. The court emphasized that the relatively
ambiguous evidence that firms knew about their rivals' price increases
before the public was reinforced by the ensuing pattern of their own
price changes and other communications. In the automotive
replacement glass conspiracy, however, dissemination of price
information by an independent organization created no such inference.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts continue to quote American Tobacco's vague definition of
agreement in section 1 cases. The Model Jury Instructions, revised in
2005, still state that an agreement may be "entirely unspoken." Since
Matsushita, however, courts have required plaintiffs to produce
evidence that permit an inference that the defendants' parallel conduct
was concerted rather than merely interdependent. In doing so, the
courts have implicitly moved toward a more specific definition of
concerted action, one that requires not only common goals and reliance,
majority rejected as evidence of conspiracy exchanges of price verifications concerning
completed transactions that were not correlated with the allegedly conspiratorial price increases.
233. Id. at 369.
234. Id. at 369-70.
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but communication that made those goals and reliance possible.
Explicit adoption of such a definition would not relieve courts and juries
of difficult problems of inference. It might, however, foster consistency
in application of the Matsushita standard and provide juries with better
guidance in evaluating evidence that courts find meets that standard.
